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Why do Korean firms invest in the EU? -  Evidence from FDI in the 
peripheral regions
This thesis examines the question of why the Korean electronics firms invest in 
the EU. It applies conventional OLl (Ownership-Location-lntemalisation) paradigm 
of Dunning to explain the motivations of Korean investment in the EU. The main 
questions in this thesis are: What are the nature of competitive Ownership (O) 
advantages of Korean firms and Location (Z) advantages of the EU? and how do both 
O and L advantages affect Korean firms’ decision to invest?
This thesis raises questions about the ‘reverse investment theory’ and refutes 
the basic logic of this theory (e.g., no clear O advantages of Korean firms, high 
labour costs of the EU, and advanced technology access as the main investment 
motivation). It mainly argues that some ‘cost saving factors’ (such as low labour costs, 
various types of grants and ability to source low-cost components from Korean 
suppliers) in the EU have been major determinants for Korean firms in the EU. In 
other words, low production cost is one of the most important location advantages that 
needs to be provided in order for Korean consumer electronics Chaebols in the EU to 
keep their competitive ownership advantages. Therefore, EU peripheral regions have 
satisfied the requirements for Korean electronics investors by offering relatively low 
labour cost and various investment subsidies, etc.
The thesis demonstrates these arguments through the various primary data 
analysis and case-studies of Korean firms in the EU. It emphasizes the particular 
characteristics of Korean consumer electronics chaebols' investment in EU peripheral 
regions which are eligible for EU Structural Funds support (including special 
assistance through the structural funds to candidate countries).
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 The Research Objectives and Questions
The European Union is the largest host to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
the world, absorbing nearly two-fifths of global investment flows and stocks 
(UNCTAD, 2001, P.56). After the 1992 deadline for the creation of the Single Market 
was achieved. Developing Countries (DCs) have rapidly increased their investment 
into the EU. Especially, the Asian NICs have been at the forefront of this increase. 
The data presented in Table 1.1 show how the share and value of FDI from Asian 
NICs in the EU have increased dramatically since the 1980s. FDI flow from Asian 
NICs rose from 565 million ECUs in 1988-1989 to 8.3 billion ECUs in 1999-2000. In 
2000, Asian NICs accounted for around 6 per cent of total amount of inward FDI into 
the EU (EU FDI year book, 2002; UNCTAD, 2001; EUROSTAT 2001c). Therefore, 
it is clear that the amount and share of EU inward FDI originating in Asian NICs are 
not negligible.
Table 1.1. Amount and share of EU of total inward FDI : Developing countries vs. 
Developed countries.
1988-1989 1993-1994 1999- 2000
FDI inflows 
(ecu/euro mill)
share o f  
EU total (%)
FDI inflows 
(ecu/euro mill)
share o f  
EU total (%)
FDl inflows 
(ecu/euro mill)
share o f  
EU total (%)
Developed 19,929 90.5 16,864 82 124,586 86.6
USA 5,118 20 9,921 48 102,534 71.3
Japan 3,216 15 1,511 7 -1828 -1.2
EFTA 8,470 41 3,855 19 15,469 10.7
Other developed 3,124 14 1,577 8 8,411 5.8
Developing 2,091 9.5 3,880 18 19,189 13.4
Asian NICs 565 2.6 1,054 5.0 8,310 5.8
AGP 18 0 145 0.4 904 0.6
OPEC 500 2.4 782 3.6 439 0.3
Other developing 1,008 4.5 1,899 9.0 9,536 6.7
Total 22,020 100 20,744 100 143,775 100
Source: Author's calculations based on data from 'EU FDI year book’ (2000); UNCTAD (2001); 
EUROSTAT (2001), European Union and its main trading partners 2000 economic and trade 
indicators.
However, very little empirical research has been done into FDI behaviour of 
Asian NICs within the EU / Moreover, current studies have emphasized that basic 
framework of conventional FDI theories (e.g. OLI paradigm of Dunning) is not easily 
applied to explain the phenomenon of Asian NICs FDI into the EU. As many current 
studies have acknowledged, it is more difficult to explain the phenomenon of NICs 
FDI in relatively more developed regions such as Western Europe and the U.S. than it 
is to account for NICs FDI in less developed countries (LDCs) such as South-East 
Asia and Latin American countries.^ According to Hoesel (1999) and Cherry (2001), 
this can be attributed to the fact that basic framework of conventional FDI theories is 
not easily applied to provide a compelling explanation for this phenomenon. Thus, 
unlike NICs FDI into the LDCs, NICs FDI into the EU related questions are still 
surrounded by controversy such as -  why do they enter the EU?; what are the 
competitive advantages of Asian firms in the EU? ; how are they different from other 
developed countries in terms of types of FDI?
The research proposed here starts with the recognition that this gap needs to be 
filled. Thus, the main topic of this thesis is to explore the FDI in the EU from Asian 
NICs -  an area of study which has not been covered extensively enough despite its 
importance. This research will examine, in particular, the case of Korean FDI in the 
EU. The case of Korean FDI is meaningful in many aspects. First of all, it is one of 
the most important sources of FDI originating from Asian NICs. For example, the 
European share of FDI (16 per cent) compared to Hong Kong (3 per cent) and 
Singapore (8 per cent) is higher (UNCTAD, 2000). Second, FDI in manufacturing is
’ The majority of studies conducted on FDI into the EU have been focused on the analysis o f the 
behaviour of FDI from major countries such as American and Japanese firms. The lack o f research on 
FDI inflows into the EU from non major countries (such as NICs FDI into the EU) has been steadily 
brought forward by several studies since the mid-1990s. For example Young, Hood & Peters, 1994; 
Dent & Randerson, 1996; Shin, 1998; Dent, 1999; Hoesel, 1999; Jung, 2000; Cherry, 2001).
 ^Recent studies have revealed a definitional problem. This is the question o f what term to use in 
classifying the development levels of the Asian NICs like Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
So far, various terms have been used for these countries, ranging from ‘third world’ (Wells, 1983), 
‘developing country’ (Cherry, 2001), and ‘emerging economy’ (Hoesel, 1999), etc. In recent works on 
Korean and Taiwanese FDI, however, the Asian NICs have been defined as being somewhere in the 
middle stage between developing and developed countries. Thus, North American, European, and 
Japanese firms have been referred to as industrialised countries (IC)firms, Asian NICs firms have been 
designated the term developing countries (DC) firms, and the remaining South-East Asian and Latin 
American firms have been called less developed countries (LDC) firms (Hsiang-Chun Chen, 1999; 
Hoesel, 1999; Cherry, 2001). This research will use this methodology to separate the countries into ICs, 
DCs, and LDCs. Asian NICs, including Korea, will be labelled as DCs to indicate the fact that they 
occupy the ‘middle ground’.
 ^Notably, UNCTAD (1996); Pike, A. & Tomaney, J. (1999); Garrahan, P & Ritchie, J (1999); and 
Dunning, et al (2001).
over 50 per cent (Hong Kong and Singapore amount to less than 10 per cent each) 
(EUROSTAT, 2000 & UNCTAD, 2001). Third, unlike other NICs such as Hong 
Kong and Singapore (where up to half of their outward FDI is undertaken by foreign 
affiliates from developed countries), an overwhelming bulk of Korean outward FDI is 
carried out by its own domestic firms (UNCTAD, 1996).
Therefore, this research will attempt to find out what motives lie behind Korean 
FDI in the EU, what advantages Korean firms hope to gain by choosing to invest in 
the EU, and what kinds of location advantages the EU provide as a host economy.
The explanatory framework provided by conventional FDI theories will be used 
as an analytical tool in this study. According to the widely accepted theoretical 
framework for the existence of FDI, the main motivations for firms to invest abroad 
come from specific competitive advantages which they possess (Dunning, 1981, 1988, 
1992, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001; Agarwal, 1985; Dunning and Narula, 1994, 2000; 
Young, et al., 1994; Ozawa, 1992, 1996; Lall, 1996; Hoesel, 1999; UNCTAD; 1999, 
2000; Chudnovsky and Lopez, 2000; Tolentino, 2001; Cantwell and Narula, 2001). In 
his famous eclectic paradigm, Dunning (1988, 1994) proposed three specific 
advantages that are necessary for FDI of MNEs (multinational enterprises) to take 
place. The first is that a firm must have ownership-specific (O) advantages over its 
competitors in a foreign country. Second, it must have internalisation (I) advantages. 
The hypothesis is that it is more beneficial for a firm to use its O advantages rather 
than to sell them, or to sell the right to use them to other firms. Third, host countries 
possess some location (L) advantages that make it more attractive to serve the market 
via FDI rather than through exports from the country of origin. These three sets of 
advantages (usually collected under the acronym, OLI) are considered to be essential 
conditions in the determination of the outflows of FDI. The explanatory framework 
offered by conventional FDI theories - the OLI paradigm (Dunning, etc)- can also be 
applied to the case of Korean FDI in the EU.
However, as many studies have pointed out, mainstream FDI theories (e.g. the 
OLI paradigm) are mostly derived from the experience of developed country’s firms 
such as the developed triad (US, Japan, and Europe). To what extent is this 
explanatory framework of conventional theories valid in explaining the phenomenon 
of FDI from developing countries such as Asian NICs? Applying this OLI paradigm 
to describe the case of Korean FDI into the EU will therefore be a meaningful 
contribution to the theoretical debates related to current Asian NICs FDI research.
Consequently, this thesis is attempting to answer the following research questions:
1. Why do Korean firms invest in the EU? And how are they different from other 
Asian countries in terms of motivation and types of investment?
2. What are the nature of competitive Ownership (O) advantages of Korean 
firms? And how do these O advantages affect Korean firms’ decision to 
invest?
3. What kinds of Location (L) advantages (i.e., characteristics of host 
country/region) does the EU provide? And how do these location advantages 
affect Korean firms’ motivation of FDI and location decision?
1.2. Explaining Korean FDi into the EU: 'Reverse FDI’?
Existing studies have emphasized that the phenomenon of NICs FDI in the EU 
(or in the US) is not easily explained by the explanatory framework of conventional 
FDI theories. In particular, when applying the OLI paradigm, it is not easy to define 
clearly what competitive advantages the NICs firms possess. Investing in the EU is 
not an easy task for Asian developing countries’ MNCs, including Korean 
manufacturing investors in the EU. There might be ‘competitive OLI constraints’ 
rather than ‘competitive OLI advantages’ (UNCTAD, 1996, p. 47; Hoesel, 1999, p. 
32; Fujita et al, 1997, p. 95; and Cherry, 2001, p. 35). According to the 1996 
UNCTAD report, there are three sets of constraints in the case of FDI from Asian 
NICs in the EU such as technological limitations, high transaction costs and high 
labour costs:
Asian investors in the EU (especially Korea and Taiwan) have competitive 
constraints, reflecting the fact that their economies are less developed than 
most European ones. Technological limitations are particularly evident in 
complex manufacturing activities and advanced services such as 
infrastructure development, communications, merchant banking or media. 
Also, transaction costs including those related to knowledge of local markets, 
culture and conditions are higher when investing in Europe than in other 
developing Asian economies. Furthermore, EU is not low labour costs 
regions. Labour costs are much higher than in Asia. (UNCTAD 1996, p.l5- 
16)
So, existing studies view such investments as being ‘exceptional’ or as instances of 
‘reverse FDI’ (which basically means that the investing firm lacks clear or, at least.
difficult to define, ownership competitive advantages)."^ The vast majority of current 
research examining Asian NICs FDI into the EU has utilized this ‘reverse FDI’ 
approach (Shin, 1995&1988; UN, 1996; Hoesel, 1999; Jung, 2000; Cherry, 2001). 
The main focus of this theory is simple. It mainly assumes that FDI from NICs in 
industrialised countries (e.g. US/EU) is made even if these firms do not possess any 
clear competitive advantages over the local firms in host developed economies. In 
other words, the O advantages of Korean manufacturers do not work properly in 
advanced countries such as the U.S. and Europe because of various constraints (e.g., 
wide technological gap, high transaction costs and high labour costs, etc.). Therefore, 
current studies have suggested the existence of alternative advantages that can 
‘replace’ the competitive advantages of the investing firm. Examples of such 
advantages include strong assistance fi'om the home government, a firm’s 
development strategy, and the strong role of L advantages provided by the host 
industrialised economies (e.g. access to advanced technological skills and 
strengthened trade barriers). Therefore, Asian NICs (including Korea) MNCs’ 
investment activity in Europe is more for ‘learning purpose’ to adopt advanced 
technology or simply for ‘avoiding trade barriers’ in a passive manner (notably. 
Cherry, 2001).
However, I argue that those current studies which adopt the ‘RDI’ approach in 
their examinations of NICs FDI in industrialised economies still leave several 
questions to be answered. Firstly, they have not paid sufficient attention to analysing 
specific characteristics of leading industries/firms which make up the major share of 
FDI cases and amount in the case of Korean FDI in the EU. Asian NICs differ 
considerably with respect to their competitive advantages. In fact, Korean FDI in 
Europe is predominantly the result of investments undertaken by several Korean 
Chaebols (large conglomerates such as Samsung, LG, and Daewoo). In addition, the 
majority of FDIs made by these Korean Chaebols have been in certain low and 
medium technology-intensive sectors (particularly in the consumer electronics and 
communication equipment sector) where they are already extremely competitive.^
To explain the phenomenon of these ‘reverse investment’ activities from DCs to developed areas, 
various terms, such as ‘reverse’, ‘upward’ or ‘upstream direct investment’, have appeared in the 
relevant literature. For example, Jun, W.T. and Prendergast, R. (1991) ‘Upstream foreign direct 
investment by Korean manufacturers’, in Development perspective fo r  the 1990s, edited by R. 
Prendergast and H.W. Singer. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
 ^Currently, the share o f the number of FDI cases in EU conducted by chaebols is 50 per cent of the 
total number of Korean FDI cases, and 95 per cent of the total amount invested. In addition, FDI in
Secondly, current studies fail to provide an adequate framework for analysing the L 
advantages of the EU. Current research on Korean firms’ FDI in the EU does not take 
into account the regional distribution of investments. In other words, current studies 
pay little consideration to region-specific characteristics in their analysis of host 
location advantages of the EU. I argue that the O advantage of FDI firms is a relative 
concept. What determines whether or not a particular FDI firm has enough O 
advantages is the level of economic development of the host economy (e.g., labour 
cost, technology and infrastructure, etc.). Thus, the competitive ownership advantages 
held by the FDI firm need to be compared with the economic situation of the host 
country (or region). This notion of region-specific characteristics is especially 
important for the case of Europe. For example, there is a huge difference between the 
types of L advantages offered by the EU Objective 1 and 2 regions on the one hand, 
and the non-Objective 1 and 2 regions on the other. Over 75 per cent of Korea’s 
manufacturing FDI is concentrated in the EU peripheral regions, while more than 80 
per cent of trade-related FDI is concentrated in the non-peripheral regions (European 
Centre of Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 2002) When considering the 
fact that peripheral regions of the EU have been the preferred target for FDI by 
Korean manufacturing firms, it is evident that a region-by-region analysis is required. 
Current approaches (notably RDI theory) do not provide comprehensive insights on 
this question.
Therefore, I argue that Korean firms in the EU can have certain level of 
competitive ownership advantages in specific sectors of technology intensive industry. 
If this is true, it seems to be inconsistent with the prediction of existing FDI theory, 
especially ‘Reverse FDI’ approach, which argues that Asian NICs firms (including 
Korean firms) do not possess the clear monopolistic advantages. Furthermore, 
locational distribution of Korean FDI also seems to be inconsistent with the 
explanation of ‘Reverse FDI approach’. According to RDI approach, insufficiency of 
transferable O advantages of NICs firms push them to invest their high technology 
intensive manufacturing sectors in economically advanced countries in order to gain 
access to the more sophisticated and advanced forms of manufacturing technologies 
used there (notably. Cherry, 2001). If it is true, Korean manufacturing investors in
special sectors (e.g. the electronics/communication equipment sector) made up over 61 per cent o f the 
total amount of Korean FDI in the EU in 2000 (The Export-Import Bank o f Korea (2002), The overseas 
investment annual trends).
Europe may prefer to invest into highly developed regions rather than peripheral 
regions which hardly provide advanced technological resources to foreign firms.
Therefore, main hypotheses of current studies (notably RDI approach) are no 
longer convincing and need to be tested. In other words, there is not enough evidence 
to simply classify Korean FDI in the EU as a form of ‘reverse PDF. For example, low 
labour cost and investment subsidies supplied by host EU peripheral regions are 
substantial, and play a crucial role in the FDI location selection process of Korean 
firms. So, to be competitive in Europe, Korean firms in the EU may have cost saving 
as main object of FDI.
1.3. The Organisation of The Argument
With this theoretical background as the basis, this research will try to apply the 
OLI paradigm to explain Korean FDI in the EU. The various theories on NICs FDI 
(e.g. RDI theory) that are currently debated will be combined to create the analytical 
firamework of this study. Consequently, this research suggests two sets of variables: 1) 
ownership advantages of Korean firms and location advantages of EU host regions as 
independent variables; 2) motivation of FDI and location decision as dependent 
variables. With this aim in mind, this research builds on the following two 
hypotheses:
1) If Korean firms have clear competitive advantages in certain sectors of 
manufacturing (e.g., consumer electronics and communication equipment), 
then Korean FDI in the EU is concentrated in these special sectors.
2) European states and their regions do not offer homogenous locational 
advantages to Korean investors. If this is true, Korean manufacturing firms 
will favour peripheral regions with cost-saving as the objective, rather than 
highly developed regions with high-technology access in mind.
Thus, this research is designed to challenge some of the established assumptions and 
theories that dominate the motivation and location choice of Korean FDI in the EU, 
notably ‘reverse PDF approach.
1.4 Research Methodology
In order to address main research questions on Korean FDI, the following 
constituted the key methodological components of the research:
■ Quantitative data: various independent sources
1) Trends and characteristics of Korean FDI in the EU 
The majority of the data is based on annual statistics/reports from Korea, mainly The 
overseas investment annual trends from The Export-Import Bank of Korea, and 
Current information o f Korean companies in Europe from the European Centre of 
Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. The two sets of data complement each 
other very well. The former provides valuable insight into the workings of Korean 
FDI flow into the EU at the EU level as well as at the member state level, but lacks 
information regarding the regional distribution of FDI inside each member state. On 
the other hand, the latter gives details at the regional level (i.e. regions which are hosts 
of Korean FDI) but fails to give a comprehensive view from the EU level. Therefore, 
both references need to be closely studied together. In addition, data will also be 
collected on other Asian FDI (notably Japan) in the EU in order to compare and 
contrast the motivation and characteristics of investments.
For the case of Japanese investment, the majority of the data is based on annual 
statistics and reports from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), chiefly 
The White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment and The White Paper on International 
Trade.^ For the case of other Asian NICs FDI, Data will also be collected from the 
standard sources (e.g. UNCTAD, World Bank, etc).
2) Korean FDI in the EU region by region 
In addition to data collected from Korean sources, it is important to examine materials 
published in the EU in order to find more detailed information about FDI region by 
region. The EU DG for Regional Policy’s Map o f eligible areas, 2000-2006 is thus 
quite useful. Through these publications, it will be possible to determine whether FDI
 ^ As compared with Korean investment data, the statistics on Japanese FDI into the EU lacks 
information regarding the regional distribution of FDI inside each member state. Although annual 
statistics and reports from the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) contain a whole range of 
indicators on Japanese FDI, they omit data on FDI by region in each country, the name of company and
from Korean firms are located in the Objective 1 and 2 regions (eligible for assistance 
from EU structural funds).
3) Characteristics of Korean electronics industry
In order to define the precise nature of the competitive ownership advantages of 
Korean firms in the EU, below documents need to be collected. The documents are 
related to 1) books on the histories of Korean Chaebols, and 2) Various books from 
Electronics Industries Association of Korea (EIAK) such as Korea’s place in the 
global electronics industry, 1997-2000.
4) Characteristics of location advantages (The EU in general and Objective 1&2 
regions in particular)
In order to examine the specific characteristics of L advantages of the EU host 
country and region, below documents need to be collected: 1) EU inward FDI, 
regional and trade policies (especially anti-dumping regulations and local contents 
rules); 2) The World Bank, World development indicators in order to analyse the 
general level of economic development of host countries. 3) Various materials from 
the Commission (especially from DG for Regional Policy) such as Main regional 
indicators, 2002 in order to analyse the economic situation of the host regions (e.g., 
GDP, unemployment rate, and labour market).
■ Qualitative data: Interviews with selected Korean companies 
Given this rationale for my choice of study, it is only logical to take a closer look 
specifically into manufacturing investments made by Korean consumer electronics 
Chaebols. This is because Korean manufacturing investment into the EU is heavily 
focused on the consumer electronics industry, a sector that accounted for 65 per cent 
of all Korean manufacturing investments. Korean electronics chaebols that actually 
have local factories inside the host region and produce goods, as well as those that 
hire a minimum number of local employees (e.g., over 50) will be used as case studies. 
Firms 'with fewer than 50 employees will automatically be excluded from the 
interview list since these are simply ’information bureaus’ or ‘distribution centres ‘(i.e. 
not actually engaged in manufacturing). There are fifteen firms that meet these 
requirements. Of these, 11 firms are currently located in the Objective 1 and 2 regions, 
and 4 have invested in the candidate member states. So, all 15 cases are located in the
sub-divided manufacturing sectors. To identify Japanese FDI in the EUbyEU regions, individual firm
peripheral regions which are eligible for Structural Funds support (including special 
assistance through the structural funds to candidate countries). Among these 
companies, especially final assemblers that employ more than 300 local employees 
have been interviewed face to face. Ten companies are final assemblers
Table. 1.2. Korean consumer electronics final assemblers in EU objective 1&2 
regions and in candidate countries
Regions EU
objective
Company Employment
UK 13 (North) Obj.2 Samsung Electronics 1,100
UKB (Northern 
Ireland)
Obj.l Daewoo Electronics 738
UK13 (North) Obj.2 LG electronics 570
FR41 (Loraine) Obj.2 Daewoo Electronics 539
DEA5 (Ansberg) Obj.2 LG electronics 350
ES 51 (Cataluna) Obj.2 Samsung Electronics 950
UKL (Wales) Obj.l LG electronics 2,000
Hungary Candidate Samsung electronics 1003
Poland Candidate LG electronics 422
Poland Candidate Daewoo electronics 1,011
Source: Extrapolated from Overseas direct investment statistics yearbook^ The National Bank of Korea, 
1995-2002; The overseas investment annual trends, 2003, The Export-Import Bank of Korea. Author’s 
survey (2000-2002); Office for official publications o f the European Communities (2002), European 
regional statistics change in the NUTS classification 1981-1999
Of these, 7 firms are currently located in the Objective 1 and 2 regions, and 3 have 
invested in the candidate member states.
The interviews focus on three main factors: first, the decision to locate within 
the EU; second, data and information on ‘costs’-related factors such as labour costs, 
investment incentives, and cost of component purchase; third, data and information on 
performance variables such as product items, profits, productivity, duration, size and 
quality of employment created, and labour market.
and sub-divided manufacturing sectors, it would be necessary to find further primary sources.
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1.5 Structure of Thesis
The thesis comprises five chapters, including this first introductory chapter:
Chapter 2: Trends and characteristics of Korean FDI in the EU
This chapter mainly examines, through data analysis, the nature, content, and 
regional distribution of Korean FDI inside the EU in order to create a framework for 
analysing the Ownership advantages of Korean FDI firms as well as the Location 
advantages of the host regions. This chapter shows how characteristics of Korean FDI 
flowing into the EU are inconsistent with the explanation of ‘reverse FDI approach’. 
This chapter proposes that Korean firms in industrialized regions such as the EU, can 
have certain level of Ownership advantages in specific sectors of industry such as 
(consumer) electronics. This chapter also shows that the peripheral regions and 
candidate countries of the EU have generated attractive locational advantages for 
Korean manufacturing FDI firms.
Chapter 3: Competitive ownership (0) advantages of Korean consumer 
electronics industry
This chapter is devoted to explaining the competitive (O) advantages of Korean
investors in the EU. In order to define the precise nature of the competitive (O) 
advantages of Korean firms in the EU, this chapter analyses specific characteristics of 
leading industry for Korean FDI in the EU (e.g. consumer electronics). In addition, 
Korean FDI in Europe is predominantly the result of investments undertaken by 
several chaebols. Therefore, this chapter also provides particular characteristics of 
the Korean electronics chaebols system. The final section explores why the EU is 
important for this leading industry (and leading firms) of Korea.
Chapter 4: Location (L) advantages of the EU: Specific characteristics of
peripheral regions
This chapter examines the specific characteristics of the Location advantages of 
EU regions. What kinds of L advantages are offered by European peripheral regions 
which make them different from other regions of the EU? This question is answered 
by analysing various ‘cost-related variables’ such as labour costs, investment 
incentives, and cost of local component purchase, etc. This chapter mainly presents
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the argument that Korean manufacturing FDI is highly sensitive to ‘costs-saving’, and 
that EU peripheral regions have satisfied the requirements of Korean investors.
Chapter 5: Conclusion
Chapter five reports on the results of the testing of the hypotheses. It concludes 
that the competitive ownership advantages of Korean firms and location incentives of 
EU host regions have significant influences on Korean firms’ investment decision. 
More specifically, it concludes that some ‘cost saving factors’ in EU peripheral 
regions have been one of major determinants for Korean firms in the EU. This chapter 
also considers its limitation and suggests some issues for future research.
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Chapter 2 
Trends and characteristics of Korean FDi in the EU 
2.1. Introduction
According to the World Investment Reports, various positive benefits can be 
achieved by conducting FDI: It allows producers to gear products more closely and 
quickly to changing consumer preferences in foreign markets; Cost savings are 
achieved through the internalization of activities within a TNG system; It enables 
producers to tap into the base of skills and knowledge in host economies, It can help 
to deal with protectionist sentiment; And a larger financial resource base due to access 
to larger markets (World Investment Report 1996, pp. 63-64; and 2001, pp.21-25). 
These various reasons for seeking to invest can be also applied by Asian MNCs. Then 
what are the reasons for seeking to invest in Europe? There are several reasons.
1) Market size and proximity. If Japan is excluded, Asia’s market size is below 
30 per cent of that of the EU (World Bank, 2003). It is vital for Asian 
economies to have a strong market presence in the EU. In addition, setting up 
direct manufacturing facilities within the EU may provide cost savings for 
Asian investors in terms of the reduced transportation and transaction costs.
2) Overcoming protectionist pressures and sentiments. One of the main reasons 
for Asian FDI in both the EU and the US has been to relieve protectionist 
sentiments in these major markets for exports. Investment in local 
manufacturing operations may be necessary for securing their market shares.
3) Access to technology, high-quality suppliers and high levels of skill. Setting 
up production facilities in Europe can provide access to a technology base. 
Small technology-based firms could be acquired by Asian investors and 
technology-based joint ventures and strategic alliances could be set up.
4) Financial support from the EU and national governments. Various grants and 
subsidies (e.g., tax relief, low interest rate loans and grants for employment and 
training) are available to Asian investors. These grants and packages are very 
effective in attracting Asian investors.
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However, as we saw in chapter 1, Asian investors in the EU have various 
competitive constraints, notably technological limitations in complex manufacturing 
activities and high production costs. Most importantly, the EU is not a low-labour 
costs area. Labour costs are higher when investing in Europe than in other Asian 
economies. Therefore it can be said that the EU is not an attractive place for 
efficiency-seeking type investment that is highly sensitive to (low) labour costs 
(UNCTAD 1996, p. 16). So, competitive ownership advantages of Asian NICs firms 
may be much more effectively exploited in Asia or other developing regions that have 
lower labour costs, simpler industrial structures and comparable levels of 
technological capability. This is the reason why current studies put the Korean case 
under the category of ‘reverse PDF. Therefore, the main reason for Asian firms to 
invest in developed regions such as the US and the EU is to expand their markets, to 
be near their major buyers, and to have easy access to technological information and 
technologies. This ‘RDI approach’ suggests that US/EU and South-East Asia 
countries possess distinct location-specific advantages for Asian NICs’ firms. The 
main L advantages of the US/EU are the presence of advanced technology and large 
markets, while the advantages of South-East Asia are low-cost labour and land 
(Hsiang-Chun Chen, 1999, p. 273).
However, I argue that those current studies still leave several questions to be 
answered: Did, and do, Korean firms decide to carry out FDI in the EU knowing that 
they lacked, and lack, clear ownership advantages? Furthermore, is Europe the single 
place where production cost is high and technological advances are great? Is Europe 
really an unattractive place for investors who pursue low production costs? As I 
argued in the previous chapter, competitive ownership advantages differ between 
firms, depending on their size and their technical abilities. More importantly, they 
also vary by industry, with some industries performing better than others. Therefore, 
to define the precise nature of competitive ownership advantages of Korean firms in 
the EU, it is necessary to look at specific characteristics of firms and types of industry 
which play a ‘leading role’ for Korean FDI in the EU. Furthermore, current research 
and analysis falls short in determining what specific locational advantages Korean 
FDI firms are able to benefit from by investing in the various regions (notably 
peripheral regions) of Europe..
Accordingly, the main purpose of this chapter is to examine, through data 
analysis, the nature, content, and regional distribution of Korean FDI inside the EU in
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order to create a framework for analysing the competitive ownership advantages of 
Korean FDI firms as well as the locational advantages of the host regions. Systematic 
data analysis of Korean FDI in Europe contributes to show the nature and direction of 
Korean investment at local, national, and European level. This chapter will show how 
characteristics of Korean FDI flowing into the EU are inconsistent with the 
explanation of ‘reverse FDI approach’. Therefore, I mainly argue that the prediction 
of current theories (mainly reverse FDI approach) is not appropriate for explaining the 
case of Korean manufacturing FDI in the EU.
To meet such an objective, the following five questions must be properly 
answered. 1) Do certain industries attract Korean FDI more than others? Or is Korean 
FDI targeted evenly towards a broad spectrum of industries? 2) Is Korean FDI being 
targeted towards specific regions or countries? Or do most countries in the EU attract 
Korean FDI equally? 3) Are certain industries of Korean FDI flowing into certain 
specific regions? 4) When comparing the form of Korean FDI directed towards other 
continents (such as Asia and North America), are there any particularities about 
Korean FDI into Europe that stand out?
In addition, for the purpose of comparative analysis, the following question 
will also be answered. 5) Are there any differences between the types of FDI flowing 
into the EU from other developed countries (notably Japan) and those made by 
Korean firms?
Therefore, the second aim of this chapter is to show how types of Korean FDI 
flowing into the EU are different from those of other developed countries (notably 
Japan). By introducing the case of Japan for the purpose of comparison, I believe that 
the nature and type of Korean investment can be much more clearly defined.
2.2 Overview of Current Korean FDI in the EU and Candidate 
Countries
The EU is the world’s largest host region for FDI, having absorbed 38 per cent 
of global inflows and 39 per cent of total stock in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2002, pp. 14-5). 
In fact, in the recent past there has been a wave of Korean investment in Europe. With 
respect to the net amount of Korean FDI flow in Europe, there has been a sharp 
increase since the late 1980s. As of December 2000, there have been a total of 586
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cases of FDI into the EU 15 member states and candidate countries such as Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic (775 cases when considering the whole of Europe). 
The cumulative total FDI is US$5.9 billion (US$6.7billion for Europe as a whole). 
Korean FDI into the EU comprises about 1 per cent of all FDI made by non-European 
firms. This figure is still dwarfed by those of other developed countries such as the 
United States and Japan (69 per cent and 6 per cent respectively) (EU Direct 
Investment year book, 2002, p. 39).
However, Korea is the largest trade partner for the EU, and it was made 
clear in Chapter 1 that Korean FDI plays an important role in any comparative 
analysis of FDI in the EU from developing countries.^ Based on 2000 figures, the 
EU’s import total from Korea equalled 24.3 billion euros, while its export total was
16.4 billion euros. The EU is currently the third largest target (16 per cent) of Korean 
FDI after Asia (40 per cent) and North America (30 per cent) in spite of Korea’s 
relatively short investment history in Europe. Table 2.1 presents the current status of 
Korean firms’ FDI by destination.
Table 2.1. Korean outward Foreign Direct Investment by destination 
(Cumulative investment; 2000)*
(US 1,000 dollars & per cent)
Asia 11,399 66.9 15,985,958 39.9
Middle East 94 0.5 796,181 1.9
North America 3,548 20.8 11,750,003 29.3
Latin America 501 2.9 3,156,043 7.8
Europe 775 4.6 6,720,905 16.8
Africa 140 0.9 725,658 1.9
Oceania 581 3.4 926,638 2.4
Total 17,038 100 40,061,386 100
Note; *. ‘Cumulative investment means the sum o f ‘total investment’ each year. (Total investment = net investment + 
liquidation, etc.) Source: The Export-Import Bank o f  Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
 ^Developing countries accounted for 13 per cent of total FDI inflow to the EU in 2000, and out of this 
figure, the Asian NICs were responsible for 72 per cent of FDI. FDI from Korea comprises about 11 
per cent of total Asian NICs’ FDI into the EU, but the Korean case is more significant than other Asian 
NICs, for two reasons. First, the European share of FDI (16 per cent) compared to Hong Kong (3 per 
cent) and Singapore (8 per cent) is higher. Second, FDI in manufacturing is over 50 per cent for 
Korean firms, while the share of FDI in this sector for firms from Hong Kong and Singapore amount to 
less than 10 per cent each.
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It is interesting to note, however, that there are differences between Korea’s 
direct investment in the EU and that in other regions. The average value of Korean 
FDI in the EU has grown faster than that of elsewhere.
As Table 2.1 shows, when analysing Korean FDI in Asia, it becomes clear that 
the total amount of investment is surprisingly low when compared to the number of 
investments. The number of cases of Korean FDI in Asia accounts for 66.9 per cent of 
the world-wide total, while the monetary amount of FDI accounts for only 40 per cent 
of the total Korean FDI world-wide. The reverse holds true for Korean FDI in Europe. 
Although the number of FDI cases is only 4.6 per cent of total Korean FDI, the 
amount of FDI in the EU -  again, measured financially - accounts for 16.8 per cent of 
total Korean FDI world-wide. As this is true for Korean investment, it can be said that 
Korean FDI in Europe is predominantly the result of large-scale investments 
undertaken by Korean chaebols (large conglomerates such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai 
and Daewoo). Currently, the share of the number of FDI cases in EU conducted by 
Chaebols is 50 per cent of the total of Korean FDI cases, and 95 per cent of the total 
amount. Similarly, for North America the number of FDI cases by chaebols accounts 
for 18 per cent of total Korean FDI cases, but 82 per cent of total amount. On the 
other hand, chaebols comprise only 11 per cent of the total number of FDI cases in 
Asia, but 69 per cent of the total amount {Table 2.2). It can be observed that Korean 
FDI in industrialized countries is usually initiated by chaebols.
Table 2.2 Shares of chaebols in Korean FDI
America
□  % of total case 
■  % of total amount
Source; The Export-Import Bank of Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
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This shows that in a highly industrialized region like the EU, Korean chaebols possess 
better comparative advantages vis-à-vis the local EU firms than do Korean SMEs 
(small and medium enterprises).
2.3. Korean investment in Europe by Country
When looking at a country-by-country breakdown of investments made by 
Korean firms, there appears to be a fairly even distribution of FDI flows across all of 
Europe. Among the EU member states, Germany has hosted the most cases of Korean 
FDI with a total of 176, followed by the UK (123 cases), France (66 cases), and the 
Netherlands (55 cases). Alternatively, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and Portugal have 
each hosted fewer than 10 cases of FDI, and clearly fall behind the likes of Germany 
and the U.K. in attracting Korean FDI. Luxembourg has the lowest number of Korean 
FDI out of all the EU member states (one case). Among the EU candidate countries, 
Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all hosted Korean FDI, attracting 53, 
16, and five cases, respectively.
If the total amount, instead of number of cases, of FDI is examined, a different 
trend emerges. While the Netherlands attracted the fourth largest number of FDI cases 
behind Germany, the UK, and France, in terms of total amount of FDI invested, it 
comes first (US$2.1 billion). The UK comes second with US$1.4 billion, followed by 
Germany with US$800 million, France (US$300 million), Italy (US$140 million), and 
Spain (US$110 million). Among the EU candidate countries, Poland ranks first, 
drawing US$580 million of FDI from Korean firms, while Hungary and the Czech 
Republic were hosts of US$120 million and US$40 million of FDI, respectively.
Table 2.3 outlines the number of cases and amount of FDI made by Korean 
firms in the EU 15 and the three other member-candidate countries.
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Table 2.3 National distribution of Korean Investment in Europe: 
Cumulative investment, 2000
(US 1,000 dollars & per cent)
Countries
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
Czech Rep. 
Hungary 
Poland 
Total
11
10
2
3
66
176
3 
9 
26 
1
55
4 
18
5
123
5
16
53
586
% of total case
1.8
1.7 
0.3 
0.3 
11  
31 
0.3
1.5
4.5 
0.1 
9.4 
0.6 
3.1 
0.8 
21 
0.8
2.8 
9.0 
100
Amount 
(US $ 1,000)
35,980
96,195
106
433
307,502
794,049
5,127
54,108
138,090
258
2,090,374
86,775
113,565
15,359
1,393,697
38,444
124,753
577,852
5,872,667
% of total amount
0.6
1.6
0.01
0.08
5.2
13.5
0.1
1.0
2.4 
0.01
35.1
1.5 
2.0 
0.2
24.0 
0.6
2.1
10.0 
100
Source: The Export-Import Bank o f Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
One obvious conclusion that can be drawn is the fact that there have been a large 
number of investments made in countries such as Germany, the U.K., the Netherlands, 
France, and Poland. Moreover, Italy, Spain, Hungary, and Ireland have also attracted, 
and continue to attract, a fair amount of FDI. Especially, some CEE countries such as 
Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have also proven very attractive for Korean 
investors (their share is 10.0, 2.1, and 0.6 per cent respectively).
In contrast with Korean FDI in the EU, Japanese FDI in Europe is 
concentrated in the UK and the Benelux countries (notably the Netherlands). 
According to the total cumulative amount until 2000, nearly 50 per cent of Japanese 
FDI is concentrated in the UK, with the Netherlands (23.5 per cent), Germany (7 per 
cent), and France (7 per cent) making up the four countries that have been the main 
targets of Japanese FDI in the EU; together these countries have received more than 
85 per cent of the total amount. Some of the annual figures reveal an even stronger 
preference for the UK, the host of 69 per cent of all Japanese FDI stock in Europe in
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1998, and although there was a drop to 45 per cent in 1999, the recipient of 78 per
cent in 2000 (Table 2.4f .
Table 2.4 shows the national distribution of Japanese FDI in the EU, including 
candidate countries.
Table 2.4. National distribution of Japanese Investment in Europe: 
Cumulative investment, 2000
(US million dollars & per cent)
Amount Amount Amount Amount Amount
(% share) (% share) (% share) (% share) (% share)
UK 44,831 (38.4) 9,780 (69.1) 11,718(45.1) 19,142 (78.4) 85,471 (48.2)
Netherlands 25,350 (21.7) 2,118 (15.0) 10,361 (40.0) 2,757 (11.3) 40,586 (23.5)
Ireland 2,944 (2.5) 180 (1.8) 310 (1.7) 305 (1.2) 3,739 (2.1)
Germany 9,911 (8.5) 553 (4.0) 649 (2.4) 320 (1.3) 11,433 (6.8)
France 10,154 (8.7) 521 (3.8) 1,127 (4.3) 325 (1.3) 12,127 (6.9)
Italy 2,165 (1.9) 301 (1.9) 118 (0.5) 58 (0.2) 2,642 (1.5)
Belgium 3,749 (3.2) 180 (2.1) 480 (1.9) 249 (1.1) 4,658 (2.9)
Hungary 468 (0.4) 10 (0.1) 270 (1.0) 234 (1.1) 982 (0.5)
Spain 1,908 (1.7) 70 (0.5) 122 (0.5) 33 (0.1) 1,094 (1.0)
Turkey 741 (0.6) 98 (0.6) 121 (0.5) 129 (0.5) 1,089 (0.5)
Poland 95 (O.I) 18 (0.1) 11 (0.1) 26 (0.1) 150 (0.1)
Czech Rep. 80 (0.1) 17 (0.1) 28 (0.1) 52 (0.1) 177 (0.1)
Switzerland 3,353 (2.9) 12 (0.1) 146 (0.6) 37 (0.1) 3,548 (2.0)
Russia 144 (0.2) 9 (0.1) 54 (0.2) 46 (0.1) 253 (0.1)
Portugal 281 (0.3) 21 (0.1) 34 (0.1) 52 (0.1) 388 (0.2)
Romania 21 (O.I) 8 (0.1) 12 (0.1) 11 (0.1) 52 (0.1)
Sweden 175 (0.2) 101 (0.6) 213 (0.9) 635 (2.7) 1,124 (0.6)
Cyprus 84 (O.I) 11(0.1) 32 (0.1) 52 (0.1) 179 (0.1)
Total 116,914 (100) 14,010(100) 25,804 (100) 24,406 (100) 181,134 (100)
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), The White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment (various years)
The Southern periphery (notably, Portugal and Spain) of the EU has attracted a 
smaller portion of Japanese FDI. Their combined share is less than 1.5 per cent of 
Japanese FDI in Europe (compared with 3.5 per cent of Korean FDI).^ In addition, the 
candidate countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic have hosted 
even less Japanese FDI. Their combined share is just 0.7 per cent of Japanese FDI 
stock in Europe; the same countries host more than 12 per cent of Korean investment
* It is well known that most Japanese banking affiliates are located in the most important financial 
centre of Europe, London. And for the same reason, the Netherlands, as the next largest host country of 
Japanese FDI in Europe, has also proven very attractive for trading and financial TNCs of Japan. 
United Nations (1996), p. 20.
 ^In Spain, Japanese manufacturing investment grew rapidly until the early 1980s, but in the 1990s the 
country did not remain a very attractive destination for Japanese FDI in Europe. However, a major 
Nissan investment in Barcelona remains the largest single Japanese project in Europe in terms of 
employment and an important indicator of Japan’s investment strategies for manufacturing in Southern 
Europe, as well as automobile manufacturing in Europe as a whole. (Darby, 1996, p.5).
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in Europe. Then why, unlike Korean FDI, is Japanese FDI highly concentrated in four 
major countries? In order to answer this question, there is a need to take an industry- 
by-industry analysis of Korean and Japanese FDI. This type of analysis will reveal a 
clear difference in the pattern of FDI carried out by Korea and Japan. A more detailed 
look at the nature of investments by each industry sector, an interesting pattern can be 
observed.
2.4 Korean Investment in Europe by Sectoral Distribution
Korean firms’ FDI in the EU is typically characterized by a concentration in 
manufacturing and trade-related retail and wholesale industries. FDI in these two 
sectors account for 78 per cent of all cases, and 87 per cent of the total amount of FDI. 
The manufacturing industry alone comprises 40 per cent of the total number of 
Korean firms’ FDI in the EU, and makes up 58 per cent of the total amount of FDI. 
The share of the number and amount of Korean FDI in the retail and wholesale 
industry is 43 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. Table 2.5 shows an industry-by- 
industry breakdown of Korean FDI in the EU.
Table 2.5. Korean investments in the EU and candidate countries: by sector
Cumulative investment, 2000
(US 1,000 dollars & per cent)
Agriculture& fishery 3 0.5 9,623 O.I
Manufacturing 233 40.0 3,419,885 58.2
Construction 6 1.0 7,131 0.1
Trade related whole sale and 253 43.0 1,995,936 34.2
retail
Transportation 25 4.3 24,009 0.4
Others 66 11.2 416,083 7.0
Total 586 100 5,872,667 100
Source: The Export-Import Bank o f Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
This type of investment pattern is comparable to that of Korean FDI vis-à-vis 
other continents. For example, the manufacturing industry takes up 80 per cent of the 
total number of investments, and around 70 per cent of the total amount of 
investments in Asia. On the other hand, investments towards the trade-related retail
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and wholesale industry comprise less than 10 per cent of total number of investments 
and only about 13 per cent of the total amount of investment. In North America, the 
manufacturing industry accounts for 26 per cent of the total number of investments 
and 48 per cent of the total amount of investments. The number and amount of 
investments related to the trade-related retail and wholesale industry sector each make 
up 31 per cent of the total number and amount of investments. Table 2.6 shows an 
industry-by-industry breakdown of Korean FDI in North America and Asia.
Table 2.6. Korean investment in North America and Asia: by sector. Cumulative
investment, 2000
(US million dollars and per cent)
Case % share Amount % share Case % share amount % share
Manufacturing 945 26.6 5,718 48.6 9,180 80.5 11,039 69.5
Trade related 
whole sale & 
retail
1,115 31.5 3,767 3Z2 963 8.4 2,144 13.4
Other 1,488 41.9 2,265 19.2 1,256 11.1 2,802 17.1
Total 3,548 100 11,750 100 11,399 100 15,985 100
Source: The Export-Import Bank of Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
As revealed in both Table 2.5 and Table 2.6, Korean FDI in the EU has a lower 
share of investments in the manufacturing industry sector but a higher share in the 
trade-related retail and wholesale industry sector when compared to Korean FDI in 
Asia. The weight of Korean FDI in the EU in the retail and wholesale industry sector 
is similar to the level invested in North America, while the amount invested in the EU 
manufacturing industry is relatively higher than that invested in US manufacturing. 
Overall, it can be said that the pattern of Korean FDI in the EU is more comparable to 
the North American model (where the share of FDI in the trade-related retail and 
wholesale industry is over 30 per cent), rather than the pattern of investment in Asia 
(where the rate of FDI in the manufacturing industry is over 80 per cent).
More interestingly, the nature of Korean FDI is in sharp contrast with the case 
of Japan, whose FDI in the EU is heavily directed toward the non-manufacturing 
sectors such as banking and insurance. In fact, Japanese investment in the EU is 
dominated by finance, insurance, and real estate companies (Japan External Trade 
Organization (JETRO), 2002, p. 51). During the period from 1995 to 1998, Japanese 
FDI in finance and insurance sectors took up over 60 per cent of the total value of 
investments. In fact, the most recent data (1998) shows that Japanese investment in
22
non-manufacturing sectors (including the finance and insurance sectors) takes up 80 
per cent of the total value of investments. In 1998, Japanese FDI entering the EU 
grew strongly to US$14 billion, an increase of 23 per cent on the previous year. As 
Table 2.7 shows, this was primarily due to a surge in FDI in finance, banking, and 
insurance to US$9.3 billion. Table 2.7 shows that most Japanese FDI in the EU is in 
trade-related activities and financial institutions rather than manufacturing industry.
Table 2.7. Japanese investment in Europe: by sector, 1995-1998
(US million dollars and per cent)
Manufacturing 1,995 (23.9) 2,871 (38.8) 2,447 (22.4) 2,873 (20.5) 10,186 (25.3)
Non-manufacturing 6,406 (75.9) 4,376 (61.1) 8,561 (77.5) 11,007(79.4) 30,350 (74.6)
*(Finance&insurance) n.a n.a *5,990 (54) *9,363 (67)
Others 69 (0.1) 125 (0.1) 196 (0.1) 130 (0.1) 520 (0.1)
Total 8,470 (100) 7,372 (100) 11,204(100) 14,010(100) 41,056 (100)
Source: Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), The White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment (2001 & 2002)
According to a recent report from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, FDI in finance 
and insurance grew to account for more than 60 per cent of total cumulative amount 
of Japanese FDI entering the EU (Japanese Ministry of Finance, 2002).
On the other hand, investments in the manufacturing sectors comprise less than 
25 per cent of total amount of investments into the EU. In 1998, the manufacturing 
industry made up just 20.5 per cent of the total amount of Japanese investment into 
the EU. In Korea’s case, however, the manufacturing industry comprised 58 per cent 
of the total amount of firms’ FDI in the EU in 1998 (The Export-Import Bank of 
Korea, 2000).
Thus, the main engine of Korean firms’ competitiveness in Europe appears to 
have been in manufacturing. However, this does not necessarily mean that Korean 
firms have competitive ownership advantages (or superiority) in all manufacturing 
industries. To analyse the competitive base of the ownership advantages of Korean 
firms, it is necessary to look at the sectors of the EU manufacturing industry in which 
Korean firms are mostly concentrated.
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2.5. Korean Manufacturing Investment in Europe by Sector
If we look at Korean FDI in a world-wide perspective, the three primary 
investment sectors are: 1) electronics/communication equipment; 2) transportation 
equipment/machinery, and 3) textile/clothes. As illustrated in Table 2.8, FDI in these 
three industries makes up 50 percent of the total number of investment cases and 68 
per cent of the total amount.
Table 2.8. Korean manufacturing investment in the world: by sector
(Cumulative investment, 2000)
Electronics & communication 1,478 14.0 7,928,907 37.0
equipment
Transportation equipment & 1,353 13.0 4,243,911 20.0
machinery
Petroleum & chemical product 945 9.0 1,772,736 8.2
Food & beverages 726 7.5 735,141 3.3
Textile & clothes 2,296 22.0 2,379,640 11.0
Leather & footwear 718 7.5 539,997 2.5
Wood & furniture 377 3.0 250,826 1.0
Paper & printing 256 2.0 312,604 1.5
Others 2,406 22.0 3,362,206 15.5
Total 10,555 100 21,526,067 100
Source: The Export-Import Bank o f Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
Thus, the main engine of Korean firms’ competitiveness in the world is to be found in 
these three industrial sectors.
Given the above assumption, is Korean FDI in these domains of industry spread 
out evenly in industrialized regions such as North America, the EU, and in developing 
regions such as Asia? Or are certain industries only heavily concentrated on in some 
continents? If this is the case, then which EU-based industry attracts the most Korean 
FDI? Korean FDI in the textile industry, Asia hosted about 78 per cent of the total 
amount of FDI. However, in the more industrialized regions such as Europe and 
North America, it amounts to no more than about 8 per cent of the total FDI. By way 
of contrast, for Korean FDI related to the electronics/communication equipment 
industry, the developed regions of Europe and North America hosted about 61 per 
cent, while Asia hosted 34 per cent. FDI for the transportation equipment &
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machinery industry was also higher in Europe and North America (51 per cent) than 
Asia (47 per cent) (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, 2003).
To summarize the findings, it seems that FDI in labour-intensive industries 
(textile, clothing) is mainly focused in Asia, while FDI in technology-intensive 
industries (especially electronics/communication equipment) is more concentrated in 
highly industrialized regions such as North America and the EU. A closer 
examination of the investment statistics for the different continents will reveal an even 
clearer pattern. Table 2.9 reveals different sectoral distribution of Korean 
manufacturing investment in the EU, Asia, and North America.
Table 2.9. Korean manufacturing investment in the EU, Asia and North
America: by sector
  __________  (Cumulative investment, 2000; % share)
Electronics & communication 61.0 43.0 13.0
equipment
Transportation equipment & machinery 26.0 20.0 3.7
Petroleum & chemical product 6.0 9.0 9.1
Food & beverages 0.9 3.0 7.0
Textile & clothes 0.5 3.0 22.0
Leather &footwear 0.2 0.3 8.0
Wood & furniture 0.4 1.0 4.0
Paper & printing 1.2 8.0 3.0
Others 3.8 12.5 30.0
Total 100 100 100
Source: The Export-Import Bank o f Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003
According to Table 2.9, a detailed scrutiny shows that Korean firms’ FDI in the 
manufacturing industry in the EU is quite distinctive from FDI vis-à-vis other 
continents. Three sectors — electronics/communication equipment (61 per cent), 
transportation equipment/machinery (26 per cent), and petroleum/chemical product 
(six per cent) — make up a total of 93 per cent of Korean manufacturing FDI. In 
particular, investment is heavily geared towards only two sectors — 
electronics/communication equipment and transportation equipment /machinery.
As for FDI in North America, although investment is concentrated in the 
electronics/communication equipment and transportation equipment/machinery 
industries, the degree of concentration is lower than in the EU. The 
electronics/communication equipment industry attracts 43 per cent of FDI, while 20 
per cent is invested in the transportation equipment/ machinery industry, and nine per
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cent in the petroleum/chemical product sector. The remaining investments are made in 
paper/printing (eight per cent), fbod/beverages (three per cent), and textile/clothes 
(three per cent), giving a more diverse character to the nature of FDI in North 
America than is evident in investment in the EU.
The Korean FDI pattern in Asia is noticeably different from that of the EU or 
North America. Textiles/clothing industry account for 22 per cent of total FDI, with 
electronics/communication equipment making up 13 per cent, followed by leather 
/footwear (eight per cent), fbod/beverages (seven per cent), wood/fumiture (four per 
cent); other labour-intensive industries also attract Korean FDI.
In summary, since technology-intensive investments (particularly in the 
electronics/communication equipment and transportation equipment/machinery 
sectors) are made in industrialized regions, it can be said that Korean firms in 
industrialized regions may possess certain comparative advantages in these sectors. 
The technological capacities existing in these sectors are a very important indicator in 
defining the nature of ownership advantages of Korean firms in the EU as they 
provide the basis for the competitiveness of manufacturers. Therefore, these capacities 
affect both the overall ability of Korean outward investors and the activities in which 
they have advantages vis-à-vis European firms. Table 2.10 implies that Korean firms 
may possess certain level of competitive advantages compared with European host 
countries, especially in certain high technology products in the manufacturing 
industry.
Table 2.10. Percentage shares of high-technology products in manufactured
exports, 2000
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Source: The World Bank, orld development indicators, 2003 
Note: Southern countries include Spain, Portugal, and Greece; Northern countries are 
Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. Figure is average o f each three countries.
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According to World Bank publications (2003), high technology products account for a 
significantly large portion of Korean manufacturing exports. Even when compared to 
Europe, the percentages are slightly lower than those for the UK, and Netherlands, but 
are still higher than the average for the whole of the EU. In particular, compared to 
the Southern peripheral countries like Spain, Portugal, and Greece, and the candidate 
countries, the percentages are much higher. What is certain is that Korea has export 
competitiveness over Europe in the high-technology product sector. Of course, it is 
difficult to conclude that just because high technology products hold a significant 
share of export items, Korean FDI firms will have competitive advantages over 
European firms in Europe. However, it can be assumed that even in a case where a 
firm carries out FDI, there is a high probability that the competitive advantages of 
firms that allow successful exports will contribute to the competitiveness of that firm 
to an extent. In other words, the competitive advantages that lead to successful 
exporting often also lead to direct investment in its own right (UN, 1996, p. 16).
Furthermore, Korean FDI in Europe is predominantly the result of investments 
undertaken by several Korean Chaebols (large conglomerates such as Samsung, LG, 
and Daewoo). In addition, the majority of FDIs made by these Korean Chaebols have 
been in certain technology-intensive sectors (particularly in the electronics and 
communication equipment sector) where they are already extremely competitive. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that Korean firms hold a certain level of competitive 
advantage compared to European firms in at least these sectors.
A unique characteristic of Korean manufacturing FDI in the EU (its high level 
of concentration in the electronics/communication equipment industry) clearly stands 
out when compared with the pattern of Japanese manufacturing FDI. According to the 
most recent figures (1998) for Japanese FDI in the US, electrical machinery (37 per 
cent), chemicals (14 per cent), and machinery (17 per cent) are the primary target 
sectors, while for Asia, the numbers are 18 per cent, 16 per cent, and 7 per cent, 
respectively. For Asia, investment in textile comprises six per cent of the total 
Japanese FDI in Asia (Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 2002). With 
respect to Japanese FDI in the EU, the percentages are similar to those of Korean FDI. 
(electrical machinery (37 per cent), chemicals (34 per cent), transport equipment 
(eight per cent), and machinery (seven per cent). However, the ratio of FDI in the 
electrical machinery sector is less than that of Korea.
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Table 2.11 Japanese manufacturing investment in the EU, Asia and North
America: by sector, 1998
Electronics & communication equipment
Transportation equipment & machinery
Petroleum & chemical product
Food & beverages
Textile & clothes
Wood & furniture
Others
Total
(% share)
37.5 37.1 18.0
14.7 15.1 29.2
34.1 14.0 16.0
2.0 5.9 3.5
0.1 0.1 6.5
2.9 1.0 3.7
8.7 26.8 23.1
100 100 100
Source; Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), The White Paper on Foreign Direct Investment (2001 & 2002)
Why then has Korean firms’ investment in electronics/communication increased 
sharply in Europe, and what were (and are) the reasons for the much greater share of 
this type of FDI compared to that made in the US? Assuming in this instance that the 
comparative advantages — mainly ownership advantages such as technical 
superiority — that Korean firms enjoy do not change irrespective of the host (North 
America or the EU), there is only one logical answer. It lies in the fact that Europe as 
a host region offers better locational advantages for Korean 
electronics/communication industries than do other highly industrialized regions.
If so, what type of locational advantages does the EU offer to investors and 
potential investors (in particular, to Korean electronics/communication manufacturing 
companies)? And do all EU member states or regions inside the member states share 
the same type of locational advantages or are there certain particularities that 
differentiate one member state or region from another? To answer this question, it is 
essential to explore the particularities of Korean FDI at a more detail level according 
to member country and region. Is FDI from Korean firms concentrated only in certain 
member states or spread out evenly? Which regions or states within the EU offer 
favourable conditions for particular industries? Specifically, which regions attract FDI 
related to the manufacturing industry (concentrated mainly in 
electronics/communication sector)? If there are regions where there have been heavy 
FDI inflows, what are their common characteristics?
2.6. Korean Manufacturing FDI by Sector and by Location
An analysis of the sector and regional trends of Korean manufacturing FDI in 
Europe will reveal whether or not states and their regions have homogeneous (or 
heterogeneous) locational advantages.
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If Korean FDI towards the EU is analysed country by country, an interesting 
phenomenon will be observed. By categorizing the study into two groups initially (EU 
member states vs. candidate states), what will stand out is that the weight of FDI 
related to the retail and wholesale industry is higher in EU member states (in terms of 
the total number of cases) than in EU candidate countries. Furthermore, the 
percentage of FDI related to the manufacturing industry is higher for EU candidate 
states than for member states. This can be seen as an investment strategy of Korean 
firms vis-à-vis the EU (i.e. applying different strategies for FDI in the already 
developed market (EU) and for the under-developed market (candidate countries, 
especially CEECs).
Table 2.12 National and sectoral distribution of Korean FDI in the EU (2000)
(unit: case & % share)
UK 55 23.0 48 19.0
Netherlands 12 5.1 30 12.0
Germany 33 15.0 106 41.0
France 29 12.5 27 10.5
Italy 13 6.0 12 5.0
Cohesion* 25 11.0 6 2.5
Northern* 1 0.5 9 4.0
Total EU 189 82.0 239 95.0
member states
EU candidate 44 18.0 14 5.0
states
Total 233 100 253 100
Source: The Export-Import Bank o f Korea, The overseas investment annual trends, 2003 
Note*: Cohesion countries include Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland; Northern countries are Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.
Looking only at individual EU member states, the share of FDI in the retail and 
wholesale industry for highly developed countries (i.e. high GDPs) is significantly 
higher than for that in the manufacturing industry. As Table 2.12 shows, for countries 
such as Netherlands, Germany, and Northern European countries, the percentages of 
FDI related to the retail and wholesale industry is much higher than for that in the 
manufacturing investment. For countries such as the UK, France, and Italy (developed 
countries), the percentages of FDI related to the retail and wholesale industry and the 
manufacturing industry are similar. And for the relatively low-developed ‘cohesion’ 
countries — Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece — the share of FDI in the 
manufacturing sector is greater than that for highly developed countries. The 
candidate countries such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic all have an
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extremely high percentage of Korean FDI in the manufacturing industry. Therefore, it 
is clear that even among EU member states, Korean firms have applied different 
strategies according to each country’s level of development.
A breakdown of FDI inflows into the EU by region reveals much more 
interesting trends. As Table 2.13 shows, the eight regions that host the most FDI in 
the trade-related retail and wholesale industry account for 83 per cent of the total case 
of Korean FDI in this sector. These regions are as follows — Darmstadt (DE 71; 
23.5%), Greater London (UK 55; 16.0%), Düsseldorf (DEA 1; 12.0%), He de France 
(FR 1; 10.5%), Noord-Holland (NL 32; 8.0%), Lombardia (IT 2; 4.5%), Saarland 
(DEC; 5.5%), and Surrey and East-West Sussex (UK 53; 3.0%) — Hence,  the 
majority of FDI related to the trade-related retail and wholesale industry is undertaken 
not in less-developed countries like Spain and Portugal, but in more developed 
countries such as Germany, the UK, France, and Italy, and especially in and around 
heavily populated cities.
Table. 2.13 Regional (sub-national) distribution of Korean FDI in the EU (2000)
(unit: case & % share)
Darmstadt 59 23.5 Northern Ireland 33 14.5
(DE 71) 
Greater London 41 16.0
(UKB)
Lorraine 27 12.0
(UK 55) 
Düsseldorf 30 12.0
(FR41)
Brandenburg (DE4) 22 9.5
(DEA 1)
He de France 26 10.5 Cataluna 10 4.5
( FRl )
Noord-Holland 20 8.0
(ES 51)
Northumberland, 10 4.5
(NL 32) 
Saarland 13 5.5
Tyne and Wear 
(UK13)
Wales (UKL) 9 4.0
(DEC)
Lombardia 11 4.5 Lisboa e Vale do 7 3.0
(IT 2)
Surrey and East-West 7 3.0
Tejo (FT 13) 
Ireland (IE) 8 3.0
Sussex (UK 53)
Other EU members 32 12.0 Other EU members 63 27.0
Candidate 14 5.0 Candidate 44 18.0
countries
Total 253 100
countries
Total 233 100
Source: elaborated from Current information o f  Korean companies in Europe from the European Centre o f  Korea Trade- 
Investment Promotion Agency; The overseas investment annual trends, 2003 ' from ‘The export-import bank o f  Korea’. Authors 
survey (2000-2002);0ffice for official publications o f the European Communities (2002), European regional statistics change in 
the NUTS classification 1981-1999
10 These detail figures are based on annual statistics/reports from Korea, mainly The overseas 
investment annual trends from The Export-import Bank of Korea, and Current information o f Korean 
companies in Europe from the European Centre of Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency. In 
order to find more detailed information about FDI region by region, the EU DG for Regional Policy’s 
Map o f eligible areas, 2000-2006 has been used.
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As Table 2.13 shows, however, the distribution of FDI related to the 
manufacturing industry is completely different. The eight regions inside the EU that 
host the most FDI related to the manufacturing sector are responsible for 55 per cent 
of total manufacturing FDI in this domain, while the candidate countries also take up 
18 per cent. These regions are: Northern Ireland (UKB; 14.5%), Lorraine (FR 41; 
12.0 %), Brandenburg (DE4; 9.5%), Cataluna (ES 51; 4.5%), Northumberland, and 
Tyne and Wear (UK 13; 4.5%), Wales (UKL; 4.0 %), Lisboa e Vale do Tejo (PT 13; 
3.0%), and Ireland (IE ; 3.0%). In addition, Poland (14.0 %), Hungary (3.0%), and 
the Czech Republic (1.0 %) make up the EU candidate countries that have hosted a 
fair share of FDI in the manufacturing sector. In other words, Korean firms’ FDI 
related to the manufacturing industry is mainly concentrated in relatively low- 
developed peripheral countries. Even when FDI in this sector is undertaken in highly 
developed countries such as the UK, Germany, and France, it is still targeted towards 
the peripheral regions of these member states. Korean manufacturing FDI is thus 
concentrated in the objective 1 and 2 regions (eligible areas for assistance of structural 
funds) such as Wales, Northern Ireland, Northumberland and Tyne and Wear, 
Lorraine, and Brandenburg. Since the candidate countries of the EU (eligible areas for 
special assistance of structural funds) account for 18 per cent of this FDI, it can be 
said that around 75 per cent of Korean FDI in the manufacturing industry is directed 
towards the peripheral regions of the Europe.
2.7. Conclusion
It can be said that Korean manufacturing firms in industrialized regions such as 
the EU have the comparative advantages and main motives of direct investment in 
technology intensive industry sectors (particularly in the electronics/ communication 
equipment and transportation equipment/machinery sector). Furthermore, in the case 
of Korean investment in the EU, it is apparent that the concentration in certain 
specific industry (e.g. the electronics/communication equipment industry) is much 
higher than that of North America as well as that of Asia.
Furthermore, over 73 per cent of Korean manufacturing FDI is concentrated in 
the peripheral regions and candidate countries (eligible for assistance of structural 
funds). Therefore, it can be said that peripheral regions and candidate countries of the
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EU have generated attractive locational advantages for Korean manufacturing FDI 
firms.
Then exactly what kinds of competitive ownership advantages do Korean 
electronics chaebols possess? And what kinds of locational advantages are offered by 
European peripheral regions, which make them different from other regions of the 
EU? These are remaining questions, which should be answered properly in the next 
chapters. In chapter 3, main competitive O advantages of Korean electronics 
chaebols will be analysed. I will show that the competitiveness of Korean electronics 
chaebols are mainly based on mass production system, cost-driven competitiveness, 
and highly standardised products. In chapter 4, the nature of L advantages of 
peripheral regions will be analysed. Chapter 4 will show that EU peripheral regions 
have offered appropriate location advantages (mainly low production costs) to Korean 
consumer electronics chaebols.
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Chapter 3
Competitive ownership (0) advantages of Korean consumer
eiectronics industry
3.1 . Introduction
As Dunning argued, the main motivations for firms to invest abroad come from 
the specific competitive ownership advantages which they possess (Dunning, 1988, 
1994, 1997; Ozawa, 1992, 1996; Lall, 1996; Hoesel, 1999; UNCTAD, 1999, 2000). 
Competitive ownership advantages are the firm specific set of capabilities that enable 
individual firms to perform well in open markets (UNCTAD 1996, p.77). For FDI, 
MNCs must have ownership-specific (O) advantages over their competitors in a 
foreign country. So the nature of this competitive O advantages is the chief 
determinant of the types of FDI as well as the quality of investment (Lall, 1996; 
Dunning, 1998).
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the nature of the competitive 
ownership advantages of Korean investors in the EU. In fact, Korean FDI in Europe is 
predominantly the result of investments undertaken by several Korean chaebols, and 
these Korean chaebols have focused highly on the consumer electronics sectors (see 
chapter 2). Therefore, in order to define the precise nature of the competitive O 
advantages of Korean firms in the EU, this chapter will look at the specific 
characteristics of the Korean consumer electronics industry.
This chapter has two parts. In the first part, the characteristics of the Korean 
electronics industry will be examined in order to explain how they could maintain 
their competitiveness in these specific electronics sectors. In fact, the Korean 
electronics chaebols have focused on a small range of products that could be mass- 
produced, thus achieving export price competitiveness. Four main products such as 
audio, colour TV, video cassette recorders and microwave ovens, accounted for 62 
per cent of all consumer electronics products exports in 1998 (EIAK 2000). So, the 
first part will try to answer the below questions: What kinds of competitive 
advantages do Korean consumer electronics chaebols possess in the world export 
market? How could they be competitive in certain consumer electronics industries? 
Concerning these questions, I argue that the main competitive ownership advantages 
of Korean consumer electronics chaebols are deeply related to both the typical mass
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production system of standardised goods with medium levels of technology, and 
cost-driven competitiveness based upon low-cost labour.
The second part of this chapter will examine the reasons behind the decline in 
competitiveness that affected the export performance of Korean consumer electronics 
chaebols in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, Korean electronics firms have seen 
a sharp erosion of their price competitiveness since the late 1980s, and this has been 
the main motivation for Korean FDI. So, the second part will analyse various factors 
which have effected this loss of competitiveness, such as rising domestic wages and 
increasing trade regulations overseas. Why did Korean electronics firms lose their 
export competitiveness? The second part provides an answer to this question and it is 
closely related to the question of why Korean firms want to invest abroad, especially 
in the EU.
The main primary sources used in this chapter are: books on the histories of 
Korean Chaebols; various books from Electronics Industries Association of Korea 
(EIAK) such as Korea’s Place in the Global Electronics Industry, 1997-2001; and 
various statistics from the National Statistical office of Korea, notably Major 
Statistics o f  the Korean Economy.
3.2 The Nature of Competitive Advantages of Korean Consumer 
Eiectronics Industry
From its beginning in 1959, the Korean electronics industry has grown into one 
of the country’s leading export industries, and is widely recognised as having made a 
major contribution to the nation’s economic development and growth (EIAK, 2001, 
p.2; Cherry 2001, p.58; Cyhn 2002, p.75). Exports in the electronics industry 
amounted to 66.7 billion US dollars in 2000, and the electronics sector represented 
almost 30 per cent (29.3%) of all Korean exports in 2000 (EIAK 2001 p.2). As can be 
seen in Table 3.1, Korea accounted for 2.6 per cent of global production of electronics 
products and ranked fifth in the world after the United States, Japan, China, and 
Germany in 1998 (EIAK 2000).
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Table. 3.1 Global Electronics Production, 1998: Share and value of top five 
countries
Value of Production (US$ bn) Share of total production (%)
United States 522.0 31.0
Japan 337.1 20.0
China 49.3 3.0
Germany 45.1 2.7
Korea 43.1 2.6
Global Total 1,682.0 100
Source: Electronics Industries Association of Korea, 2000
Korea accounted for 5.5 per cent of the global production of consumer electronics 
products in 1998 and ranked fifth in the world after Japan (20.7 per cent), China (15.2 
per cent), the US (7.6 per cent), and Malaysia (6.8 per cent)^\ By the mid-1990s, 
Korea had become the largest manufacturers of colour TV sets and microwave ovens 
in the world, taking global market shares of 40 per cent for these products (EIAK 
2000).
What are the main reasons for the fast growth of Korean electronics industry? 
How could they be so competitive in world export market? A number of forces are 
significant such as high export dependency, abundant low-cost labour, and an 
oligopolistic market structure dominated by Chaebols. Other factors are the 
dominance of a few mature and standardized products and medium levels of 
technology. These factors constitute the important characteristics of Korean 
electronics industry and have helped to shape the FDI activities of Korean electronics 
firms.
' * Before the financial crisis of 1997, Korea was the second largest producer of consumer electronics in 
the world behind Japan, realising about 9.8 per cent of global production (EIAK 1997).
A survey of current literature has revealed a number of characteristics of the Korean consumer 
electronics industry. For example. Cherry (2001) identified several key factors: 1) high degree of 
dependence on exports, 2) availability of low-cost labour, 3) the inducement of foreign technology, and 
4) the domination of export by a few mature and standardized products. In addition, Jung (2000) 
suggested four main driving forces acting on the fast growôi of the industry: 1) export-led 
industrialisation, 2) state-led industrialisation, 3) ChaebolAed growth, and 4) low wages-based 
competitiveness
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3.2.1 Export orientation : Promoting exports as a means of development of firms
Firstly, in terms of market orientation, the electronics industry has been a 
strategic export industry, and has been highly focused on exports since the 1960s. 
This outward-looking industrial approach has determined the level of production and 
product technology and influenced their competitive sources on the global market. 
(Shin 1995, p. 130; Jung 2000, p. 104; Cherry 2001,p.72). The limited size of the 
Korean market forced electronics firms to promote exports as a means of continued 
growth. Therefore, price competitiveness could only be achieved through mass 
production, and the local market was too small be relied on to absorb domestic 
output. This export-led development has led Korean electronics firms to be 
competitive in world export market through strategy of mass production and mass 
exports.
The Korean electronics industry has had a high share of total Korean 
memufacturing export activities. It increased from 12 per cent in 1980 to 32.2 per cent 
in 1994. Even in the early 2000s, the share stayed above 29 per cent (EIAK, 2001). In 
addition, the export dependency ratio (the share of total sales accounted for by foreign 
markets) in the electronics industry gradually increased from 52.0 per cent in 1970 to 
70.3 per cent in 1980, and it reached 82.2 per cent in 1998 (Park 1996, p. 178; EIAK 
1999, P.4). This high level of export dependency has left Korea vulnerable to changes 
in the business environment such as exchange rate fluctuation, trade regulation change 
(e.g., import restrictions, tariff and non tariff barriers), the erosion of price 
competitiveness, and challenges from developing countries that enjoy the advantage 
of low production costs (Hobday, 1995; Hoesel, 1999; Jung, 2000; Cherry, 2001). As 
Lipietz pointed out earlier, the Korean (consumer) electronics industry can be 
understood as a typical internationalised industry, which continues to export Fordist 
goods at either the final or intermediary stages (Lipietz 1987, p.81).
3.2.2. The advantage of abundant, low-cost labour
In terms of labour relations, low labour costs had been the main competitive 
strength of Korean electronics industries with low and medium levels of technology 
(based upon assembly technology). Ernst (1994) argued that the rapid growth of 
Korean electronics industry was mainly based on the advantages of low labour costs 
and mass production. Since the 1960s, Korean electronics firms have aimed at mass 
employment with low wages, which is appropriate to the combination of mass
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production and mass export. As a result, their success and failures on the global 
export market have been heavily dependent upon maintaining low labour costs in 
order to achieve global competitiveness (Shin 1998, p. 102; Jung 2000, p. 105; Cyhn, 
2002, p.75). From the 1960s until the late 1980s, the Korean military government 
strictly controlled labour wage, freezing and the prohibition of labour disputes and 
labour movements. This allowed electronics chaebols to continue their intensified 
exploitation of labour thus maintaining their price competitiveness. Therefore, the 
success of the Korean electronics industry was heavily dependent upon state and firm 
level controls on the level of wages. In fact, hourly manufacturing wages in Korea 
remained well below those earned in industrialised countries until 1990 (table 3.2).
Table 3.2. Hourly Manufacturing Wage Rates, 1980-1990
1980 
(US $)
1985 
(US $)
1987 
(US $)
1988 
(US $)
1989 
(US $)
1990 
(US $)
Growth 
Rate (%) 
80-90
Korea 1.03 1.35 1.78 2.50 3.57 4.16 15.4
Japan 5.61 6.43 10.83 12.80 12.63 12.84 8.8
Taiwan 1.00 1.50 2.26 2.82 3.53 3.98 15.0
S’pore 1.49 2.47 2.31 2.67 3.15 3.78 9.7
Mexico N/A 1.60 1.06 1.32 1.60 1.85 N/A
USA 9.84 12.96 13.40 13.85 14.28 14.83 4.2
Germany 12.33 9.56 16.91 18.04 17.51 21.30 3.8
UK 7.43 6.19 8.97 10.46 10.43 12.42 9.2
France 8.94 7.52 12.42 12.96 12.60 15.25 9.3
Source: Ku 1992 p. 40; National Statistical office of Korea, 1997; Cherry 2001, p.67
Therefore, up until the late 1980s, the Korean consumer electronics industry had been 
successful due to the maintenance of low domestic labour costs. However, this low- 
cost labour advantage disappeared after 1990 due to a series of sharp wage increases.
3.2.3. Oligopolistic m arket structure : Chaebol-led industry
The Korean Chaebols have been a dominant force in the Korean economy, and 
the electronics industry is a prime example of a chaebol-led industry. The consumer 
electronics industry was, particularly, primarily developed by the ‘Big Three
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chaebols' such as Samsung, LG, and Daewoo under government supportive and 
developmental s c h e m e s T h e  Korean government fostered export industries through 
the uneven distribution of loans and funds to these chaebols (Choi, 1995; Shin, 1998; 
Jung, 2000; Hoesel, 1999; Cherry, 2001; Cyhn, 2002). In other words, the 
government’s policy of offering support to these chaebols to develop as world-class 
exporters, and its promotion of volume-led industrial development in the 1960s and 
1970s was a major factor in the creation of an oligopolistic market structure within the 
electronics industry. According to UNCTAD (1996, p.77), a government can play a 
crucial role in increasing the competitiveness of a country’s firms, by providing the 
correct incentives and signals for firms to undertake the risky and costly task of 
developing competitive capabilities. This extensive assistance by the government to 
the chaebols included capital (policy loans), a domestic market (import protection), 
cheap labour (strict labour laws) and export push (export incentives) (Cyhn 2002, 
p.85). In addition to benefiting from the government’s support, electronics chaebols 
enjoyed certain advantages over smaller domestic competitors in terms of their access 
to funding, their ability to establish and operate global production facilities, the 
support they received from other companies within the family owned group and so 
forth. Within each chaebol, the electronics affiliates have been seen as flagship 
companies which make a major contribution to the groups’ domestic and overseas 
sales, and to their overall profits (Cherry 2001, p.77). This was the context in which 
Korean electronics chaebols were able to achieve their competitiveness through the 
combination of ‘mass production and mass export’. A s  Cyhn argued, large sized 
Korean firms {chaebols) could undertake the cost and risk of absorbing very complex 
technologies, further develop it through their own R&D, set up world-scale facilities 
and create their own brand names and distribution network (Cyhn, 161-165)^^
In 1988, the official definition of chaebol was total assets exceeding 400 billion Korean won (about 
US$ 500 million)
Yet, some believe that the domination of chaebols has caused many o f the problems of small and 
medium sized firms (SMEs). As the domestic human and physical capital pool is dominated by 
chaebols, Korea’s SMEs have become mere sub-contractors to chaebols. In 1985, more than 40 per 
cent of the SMEs identified contracted work from chaebols as their major source of income. Notably 
Ernest (1997) argues that the government support for the SMEs has been insufficient.
Firms’ demographic variables - such as size, number of employees, capital, cumulative international 
experience, and existence of established affiliates - are regarded as important elements of O advantages 
and may have certain influences on their location decisions of FDI (Dunning, 1988; Buckley, 1989; 
Hsiang-Chun Chen, 1999). The oligopoly model suggests that large MNEs can afford to use FDI more 
often and more actively in FDI expansion; they may also have more ventures because they have 
sufficient resources to support their activities. According to Hsiang-Chun Chen (1999), firms with less 
export experience may conduct FDI in locations with low costs (e.g. South-East Asia).
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In 1988, Samsung, LG and Daewoo accounted for almost two thirds (65.9 per 
cent) of electronics production in Korea ; within the consumer electronics sector they 
accounted for about 90 per cent. By product, those chaebols fully controlled the 
market for video cassette recorders, microwave ovens, refrigerators, and washing 
machines (100 per cent), and took 82.2 per cent share of the production of colour TV 
sets (Pae, et al 1990, p.33). Even in the 1990s, the electronics industry was still 
dominated by a limited number of chaebols. The total share of sales taken by the ‘big 
three’ chaebols accounted for over 65 per cent of all electronics production in 1995 
(EIAK, 1999). As table 3.3 shows, of the top ten electronics firms, only three did not 
belong to these ‘big three’ in 1995.*^
Table 3.3 The top 10 electronics companies in Korea, 1995
Company name Sales
(billion Korean won)
Share/ top 10 
(%)
Employees
1.Samsung electronics 8,714 47.6 47,600
2. LG electronics 3,677 20.0 31,000
3. Daewoo electronics 1,640 8.9 12,348
4. Samsung display device 1,181 6.4 11,000
5. LG cable and machinery 741 4.3 5,600
6,Samsung electro-Mechanics 730 3.9 7,050
7. Anan industrial 545 2.9 6,225
8. Trigem computer 388 2.1 1,500
9. Orion Electric 384 2.0 4,927
10. Daewoo Telecom 361 1.9 2,467
Total top 10 sales 18,361 100 129,717
Source: EIAK (1999)
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, Korean investments abroad have been 
predominantly the result of investments undertaken by these chaebols. In fact, 
chaebols accounted for 95 per cent of the total FDI amount invested in the EU (see 
chapter 2).
By the mid 1990s, the top 30 chaebols controlled 75 per cent of the country’s GNP. While 
comprising only 1 per cent of the total number of companies in Korea, Chaebols accounted for 34 per 
cent of the labour force, 60 per cent of the capital and 62 per cent of total exports (Lee 1996, p. 107)
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3.2.4 Focusing on a small range of mature and standardized products
As a newly industrialised country, Korea mainly relied on imported technology 
to build the foundation of its industry. According to the Late Industrialisation 
Paradigm (LI paradigm) (Amsden, 1989, 1991; Amsden and Hikino, 1993; Hikino 
and Amsden, 1994), a common characteristic of Asian NICs is that even their leading 
companies have to grow without the competitive asset of pioneering technology. 
Therefore, learning from others or borrowing technologies at the beginning of their 
growth is the only source for their technological enhancement. Therefore, Korean 
electronics chaebols have focused on a small range of products which could be mass 
produced, and enhancing export price competitiveness (Cherry, 2001: pp 79-80; 
Cyhn, 2002:pp. 152-155).
During the 1980s, a few products like radio cassettes, video cassette recorders, 
colour TVs, and micro wave ovens accounted for over 60 per cent of production in the 
Korean consumer electronics sector. The share of these main products was 63.6 per 
cent in 1983, and 61.1 per cent in 1988. By 1991, the same four products accounted 
for more than 70 per cent of the total production of consumer electronics goods and 
took 91 per cent of all consumer electronics exports (Ku 1992, p.32). Even in the late 
1990s, these products still accounted for 61.5 per cent of total consumer electronics 
production and 61.8 per cent of total consumer electronics exports. (ElAK 1999, p.l- 
4). Table 3.4 shows detailed amounts and the share of these main products in Korean 
consumer electronics production and exports.
Table. 3.4 Consumer electronics: Production and export proportion by sectors
(1998 figures)
Item Production 
(100 M Korean 
won)
% share /total 
c. electronics 
production
Export 
(M US $)
% share/total 
c, electronics 
export
C-TV 22,011 22.6 933 17.3
VCR 12,376 12.8 530 9.9
Audio 14,895 15.3 1,161 21.6
Micro Wave Oven 10,463 10.8 694 13.0
Washing Machine 7,072 7.3 241 4.5
Air conditioner 8,366 8.6 397 7.4
Others 21,969 22.6 1,422 26.3
Total 97,152 100 5,378 100
Source: ElAK 1999, P. 3-4.
40
A high concentration on a small number of mature and standardised products has 
led Korean electronics industry to be competitive in world export market with the 
benefits of ‘mass production - low labour costs’. However, since the late 1980s, it also 
brought problems for the Korean electronics firms in terms of the intensification of 
trade barriers in importing countries such as the EU and the US.
3.3 The Erosion of Korean Electronics Chaebols* Export 
Competitiveness
Since the late 1980s, changes in the domestic and global business environment 
have had a significant impact on the consumer electronics industry. Korean 
electronics chaebols saw a sharp erosion of their competitive advantages (mainly 
cost-driven competitiveness). The domestic factors in this loss of competitiveness 
were rising wages, and labour problems. The external factors were increasing trade 
restrictions overseas and the challenge from other Asian developing countries.
Firstly, rapid increase in labour costs was a key factor in the erosion of Korean 
electronics firms’ export price competitiveness in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
As presented in table 3.5, annual wages rose at an average rate of 22.7 per cent 
between 1988 and 1993, and this figure was almost twice that in other Asian 
developing countries. As a result, average wages in the Korean electronics industry 
were twice those in Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia and six times those in 
Thailand in 1993.
Table. 3.5. Annual growth rate and average wages in the electronics industry: 
Korea and other Asian Countries, 1988 - 1993
Annual Growth Rate 
1988- 1992
Average wages 
1993
Korea 22.7 116
Taiwan 10.9 120
Thailand 14.1 18
Malaysia 13.9 44
Singapore 10.7 60
Hong Kong N/A 86
Source: Pak, et al., 1994, p.42-43; Jung 2000, p.l 15
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Therefore, the main Korean export industries, such as textile and consumer 
electronics, which are mainly based on the advantages of cost-competitiveness have 
been severely challenged by other East Asian developing countries, like Malaysia, 
Thailand, and China. In other words, because of increased competition from other 
developing countries and domestic real wage rises, the traditional competitive 
ownership advantage of Korean electronics firms based on labour-intensive mass 
production, started to erode (Hoesel 1999: 117). The firms in Asian developing 
countries were exploiting the advantage of a low-cost labour base that was now lost to 
Korea. The threat was strongest from Malaysia and Thailand in the labour-intensive, 
medium to low technology product markets (Pae et al 1990, p.55).
Secondly, there was another threat to price competitiveness arising from trade 
friction in industrialised markets, notably in the EU and the US. In fact, since the 
1970s import restrictions have targeted labour-intensive consumer electronics 
products such as micro wave ovens, colour TVs, audios and video cassette recorders 
(Shin, 1998; Cherry, 2001). Between the 1980s and 1990s, out of all Korean 
electronics exports to the EC, around 30 per cent faced trade restrictions of one kind 
or another: anti-dumping investigations and voluntary export restrictions, for example 
(Cherry, 2001 p. 68; ElAK, 1999, chapt.3). Europe and America reacted to low priced 
Korean consumer electronics products with the imposition of trade barriers; seriously 
threatening the competitive advantage of Korean electronics chaebols}^
3.4 Motivation of Korean Electronics FDi since the Late 1980s
Domestic and external factors such as rising wages and increasing trade 
restrictions played a critical role in educing Korean corporate profitability. As table 
3.6 shows, Korean corporate profitability in manufacturing and in the export industry 
had fallen sharply during 1986 and 1989, even though it increased again between 
1991 and 1995.
In fact, it can be said that trade restrictions of the EU such as anti-dumping actions and quantity 
(quota) restrictions have actually contributed to increasing production costs for Korean electronics 
companies. For example, for the case of Samsung electronics in the UK, those EU trade protectionist 
measures caused at least 15 per cent of price increase of main electronics products such as CTVs and 
MWOs (Ms .S.K Kim (Korean managers), August. 2003)
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Table 3.6 Korean corporate profitability in manufacturing and export industry: 
1985-1995
—  m a n u factu rin g  
' - e x p o r t  industry
1985 1987 1989  1991 1993 1995
Source: Chang, H.J. et al., 1998: 742; Jung, 2000: 44)
At the same time, these factors have also been the main motivation for Korean FDI 
since the late 1980s. Therefore, Korean FDI has been deeply related in the reaction to 
the diminishing competitiveness in Korean export industries. The only way out of the 
crises was outward FDI to low-production costs countries such as Southeast Asia. So 
this type of Korean FDI has mainly concentrated on Southeast Asia and Latin 
America. Using the conventional OLI paradigm to understand why Korean electronics 
firms would invest in relatively less-developed countries is simple. The search for 
lower production costs to keep their competitive advantages has promoted Korean 
firms to invest heavily in developing countries.
Then why do Korean electronics firms want to invest in the EU which is one of 
more developed economies? The EU is not a low labour-cost area. Labour costs are 
higher when investing in Europe than in other Asian economies. Efficiency-seeking 
investment that is highly sensitive to (low) labour costs is not attracted to the EU. So, 
the competitive ownership advantages of Korean firms may be much more effectively 
exploited in Asia or other developing regions that have lower labour costs, simpler 
industrial structures and comparable levels of technological capability. What are the 
main motivations of Korean FDI in the EU? How could it be explained in the 
framework of OLI paradigm?
According to current studies, the investment activity of Korean firms in Europe 
is generally more for Teaming purpose’ to adopt advanced technology or simply for 
‘avoiding trade barriers’ in a passive manner rather than for exploiting their main 
competitive O advantages. As many current authors emphasized, the main location
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advantages of the US/EU are the presence of advanced technology and large markets, 
while the advantages of South-East Asia are low-cost labour. Therefore, the main 
reason for Asian firms to invest in developed regions such as the US and the EU is to 
expand their markets, to be near their major buyers, and to have easy access to 
technological information and technologies. (UNCTAD 1996, P.64; Hsiang-Chun 
Chen, 1999, p. 273). Similar views are shared by Shin (1998), Hoesel(1999) and Jung 
(2000) which argue that Asian NICs’ FDI in the EU and the US have resulted mainly 
from the changing extra-EU trade regulations and access to advanced technology 
rather than from the search for low production costs. Thus, current studies have 
argued that Korean manufacturing FDI in the EU does not necessarily require 
competitive ownership advantages that are generally perceived to be a necessary 
condition for FDI. More recently. Cherry (2001) also argued that the ownership 
advantages of Korean investors in the EU are too weak to offset the cost of 
foreigimess. According to her, the main motivation of Korean investment is to benefit 
from the location specific advantages offered by EU host nations such as access to 
high technologies and large markets (Cherry, 2001, p. 171). In her book. Cherry wrote:
“In common with other major industries in Korea, manufacturers of home 
appliances have faced rising production costs at home, increasing trade 
restriction overseas, and fiercer competition in the domestic, as well as the 
global market. Therefore, the search for low production costs has prompted 
Korean electronics companies to invest heavily in developing countries, while 
the need to avoid trade barriers and acquire advanced technology and skills 
vital to industrial restructuring has attracted Korean electronics investors to 
the EU and US, despite the erosion of their competitive advantage in these 
markets” (Cherry, 2001, P.71).
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Table 3.7 Current theoretical explanations of Korean FDI: Southeast Asia, and 
EU/US
Core concepts FDI in Southeast Asia FDI in EU/US
(O) advantages -Clear technology superiority 
-Possible to maintain main 
competitive advantages (based on 
cost driven competitiveness)
-No clear advantages
-No cost-driven competitive
advantage
(I) advantages - FDI is clearly better to exploit O 
advantages than to sell them, or 
to sell the right to use them to 
other firms.
-No clear advantages 
-Importing key components from 
home country is restricted by EU 
local contents rule
(L) advantages -Low labour cost 
-Access to natural resources 
-Technology transfer to host 
countries
-Favourable incentive packages
-Trade barriers such as anti­
dumping duties, import quota and 
other non tariff barriers 
-Access to advanced technology 
through M&A
-Access to large market (SEM) 
-Host government incentives
Motivation/ Type -Cost saving motivation 
-Efficiency seeking type
-Typical trade related investment 
-Technology seeking ‘reverse FDI’
Source: Author’s summary, compiled from literature
As summarised in table 3.7, all these current researchers point to the location 
advantages of the host economy such as access to high technology and the avoidance 
of trade restrictions as the main motivation of Korean electronics FDI in the EU. 
However, this thesis refutes those studies. Is Europe really an unattractive place for 
investors who pursue low production costs? In chapter 4, I argue that Korean 
electronics firms in the EU may have ‘cost saving’ as their main FDI objective. 
Korean FDI in the EU has been positively influenced by protectionist measures, but 
technology sourcing in high tech sectors is not the case for Korean electronics firms. 
When considering the fact that peripheral regions of the EU have been the preferred 
target for their investment, maintaining their competitive advantages (mass production 
of limited range of highly standardised goods with low production costs) is still one of 
important incentives for Korean investors in the EU as well as other incentives such 
as avoiding import restrictions and non-tariff barriers.
3.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the main competitive O advantages of Korean consumer 
electronics chaebols are based on the mass production system, cost-driven
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competitiveness, and highly standardised products. This competitiveness of Korean 
chaebols has been declined since the late 1980s and early 1990s because of rapid 
wage increases, and trade friction in industrialised markets. Therefore, maintaining 
their competitive advantages has been an important incentive for Korean investors 
abroad.
Then the question remains as to why Korean consumer electronics chaebols 
invest in the EU, which is generally understood to be a high production cost area. Is it 
true that there is no possibility for Korean electronics firms to maintain their 
competitive O advantages when located in Europe? Unlike the main assumption of 
current studies, I argue that maintaining their competitive advantages is still an 
important incentive for Korean investors in the EU. In the next chapter, I will show 
that EU peripheral regions have offered appropriate location advantages (mainly low 
production costs) to Korean consumer electronics chaebols.
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Chapter 4
Location (L) advantages of the EU: Specific characteristics of
peripheral regions
4.1 . Introduction
As discussed in the above chapters, location-specific advantages are assumed to 
have significant influences on a firm’s FDI decisions in the OLI paradigm (Dunning, 
1988, 1997). While O- and I- type advantages are firm-specific determinants of FDI, 
L advantages are country-specific. To attract FDI, the host country (or region) must 
possess L advantages; these include factor cost advantages, proximity to the market, 
and an existing economic structure and legal, social, and political frameworks 
conducive to foreign investment. The FDI activities of firms have been shown to be 
related to the characteristics of their competitive advantages and to reflect the 
resources abundant in host locations (Dunning, 1993, 1997). This suggests that there 
are some links between the comparative advantages of host countries and the FDI 
activity of firms. (Dunning and Narula, 2000).
Therefore, this chapter will try to answer the question concerning why EU 
regions are attractive for Korean consumer electronics investors. I assume that host 
regions within the EU do not provide the same kinds of locational advantages for 
inward investors. Especially given that Korean manufacturing FDI has been 
significantly concentrated in the EU’s less developed regions (Chapter 2), so it 
examines the specific characteristics of the L advantages of EU peripheral regions. 
Therefore, this chapter will provide a framework for analysing primary questions such 
as: What kinds of L advantages are offered by European peripheral regions to Korean 
firms in particular? And how have these L advantages of peripheral regions supported 
Korean investors to maintain their competitive advantages within the EU?
In this chapter, I show that in terms of production costs, although average 
labour cost levels are higher in Western Europe than in Korea, there are low labour 
cost areas within the EU and in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, financial assistance for 
those low cost production locations from the EU has increased the attractiveness of 
these regions for Korean consumer electronics investors. For this reason, Korean 
electronics chaebols have mainly invested in the EU peripheral regions (objective
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1&2 regions and candidate countries) which offer appropriate locational advantages to 
maintain their competitive ownership advantages (mainly cost-driven competitiveness 
with low production costs). As was shown in chapter 3, this point is inconsistent vrith 
the prediction of existing studies which mainly argue that efficiency seeking type FDI 
with cost saving motivation is not the case for Korean FDI in the EU.
For this chapter, the main primary materials are related to: 1) The World Bank, 
World development indicators in order to analyse the general level of economic 
development of host countries; 2) Various materials from the Commission (especially 
from DG for Regional Policy) such as Main regional indicators, 2002 in order to 
analyse the economic situation of the host regions (e.g., GDP, unemployment rate, 
and labour costs); 3) Korean Foreign Economic Policy Research Centre (1998) 
Incentive Package fo r  Korean FDI: Case study o f major countries, UK case. Also, 
information from interviews with selected Korean companies in the EU will be 
presented.
To summarise, this chapter will mainly present the argument that Korean 
manufacturing FDI is highly sensitive to ‘costs-saving’, and that EU peripheral 
regions have satisfied the requirements of Korean investors by offering relatively low 
labour cost and various investment subsidies, etc. This chapter is divided into three 
sections. In the first section, the importance of sub-national level analysis is presented. 
Secondly, an attempt is made to identify the particular nature of EU peripheral regions 
along with an analysis of some cost-related factors such as labour costs, investment 
subsidies, and local content rules. In the final section, the main motivation (cost- 
saving related) of Korean electronics chaebols in EU peripheral regions will be 
discussed.
4.2. The Importance of Local and Regional Level Analysis
With the launch of the EU’s cohesion policy at the end of the 1980s increasing 
emphasis has been placed on the local and regional (i.e. sub-national) levels as well as 
supranational or national levels of the motivations for FDI to take place in Europe^*, 
lammarino and Santangelo insist that:
** Sub-national actors have become formally involved in the regional policy process at the 
implementation stage through ‘the 1988 reform of the structural funds’. According to some Ph.D. 
research in Sheffield University, this reform provided clearly identifiable networks operating within the 
domestic EU regional policy process. Bache, I. (1996) EU regional policy: has the UK goxernment
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The competitive advantages of a region is created and sustained through 
highly localised processes, which are in turn reinforced by the location’s 
capacity to attract resources from outside. Given the growing importance 
of the local dimension of MNEs’ activity, regions turn out to be a more 
appropriate unit of economic analysis, as nation-state-based investigations 
are likely to neglect important phenomena. Regional inequalities 
reinforced by cumulative causation mechanisms and consequent 
convergence (divergence) processes within national borders may not be 
captured at all through analyses at the national level (lammarino & 
Santangelo, 2000 p. 5&8)
Therefore, it can be said that EU investors turn out to be increasingly interested in the 
sectoral comparative advantages of regional economic systems as well as the 
development of supranational economic integration such as the implementation of 
anti-dumping regulations and the creation of the Single European Market (SEM) in 
1992 (lammarino & Santangelo, 2000). In this context, it is worth looking at the 
different degree of attractiveness of EU regions for FDI by distinguishing between 
peripheral regions which are mainly supported by EU regional policy (i.e. Objective 1 
and 2 regions) and non-objective regions. lammarino and Santangelo, in looking at 
the Italian case, have also argued that:
While Northern Italy is far more integrated in the European economic 
context, the South is a main target of the European Union regional policy 
aiming at intra-EU regional convergence. Thus, if the ‘global-local’ 
development of MNE’s activity seems to call for a more detailed 
description of location choices, the need for a regional analysis is even 
stronger when one looks at sub-national heterogeneous realities such as 
those occurring in Italy (lammarino & Santangelo, 2000 p. 5).
In fact, there are striking disparities in economic performance between EU peripheral 
and non-peripheral regions. GDP per head is typically half to two-thirds of the EU 
average in Objective 1 regions (Commission, 6^ Periodic Report, p. 1). More 
specifically. Objective 1 regions consist of those regions whose per capita GDP does 
not exceed 75% of the Community average, as well as the thinly populated regions of 
Finland and Sweden (fewer than 8 people per sq.km.). All these regions have a
succeeded in playing the gatekeeper role over the domestic impact o f  the European regional 
development fund? Published Ph.D. thesis, Sheffield University, DX 197276, chapt.2 
Immarino & Santangelo (2000) ‘Foreign Direct Investment and regional attractiveness in the EU 
integration process. In European urban and Regional Studies, vol. 7(1): p. 5-18
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number of economic indicators "in the red"; such as low investment levels, higher 
than average unemployment rates, lack of services for people and businesses, and 
poor basic infrastructure. Objective 2 regions include regions undergoing industrial 
conversion, and are usually more centrally located. These characteristics must be 
considered in attempting to assess the attractiveness of these regions for FDI.
So in analysing the location specific advantages of EU host regions, it must be 
noted that there are differences between them in their endowments of 
entrepreneurship, organizational capacity, skills, propensity for innovation, 
technological competence, and production costs. The less developed regions in the 
EU have the highest priority for the allocation of funds for the promotion of social 
and economic development. Thus, to explore the influence of the comparative 
location advantages of the EU regions (especially Objective 1 and 2 regions) on the 
determinants of entry by Korean firms, it is necessary to analyse these factors at the 
sub-national level.
However, very little has been written concerning the analysis of sub-national 
structures and the flow of FDI. In other words, current research on Korean FDI in the 
EU does not take into account the regional distribution of the FDI firms. It is clearly 
impossible to argue that the EU offers a single type of L advantage. There is a huge 
difference between the types of L advantages offered by different EU regions. Most of 
current studies have failed to notice the fact that European states and their regions do 
not offer homogeneous locational advantages to Korean investors. That is why current 
studies have insisted that the EU is not a low-production cost area and that cost-saving 
investment is not possible.
4.3 Particular Characteristics of Ell Peripheral Regions
A number of writers have discussed the different location attractions which 
influence firms’ location decisions. The total GDP and market size of the host area 
can be of some significance (notably, Resmini, 2000). Other factors, such as the 
availability of labour resources and infrastructure, can also be important (Girma, 
2002). In addition, certain host government policies such as regional grants and 
restrictions on FDI firms are also meaningful (Hubert and Pain, 2002).^® In the OLI
For further details on the role of regional incentives for attracting FDI, see Amin, A., Bradley, J,, 
Gentle, C. (1994), “Regional Incentives and the quality o f mobile investment in the less favoured 
regions o f the EC”, Progress in Planning, 41 (1), pp. 1-22; and Thomas, D. (1996) “Winner or Loser in
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paradigm, Dunning highlights the cost factors related to location advantages such as 
availability of low-costs labour, raw materials, capital/technology, and other costs 
factors including host government incentives. This chapter focuses on the analysis of 
‘cost factors’ to explain the L advantages of EU peripheral regions.
4.3.1 Labour costs of £U  peripheral regions
The term labour costs refers to the expenditure borne by employers in order to 
employ workers. Labour costs exercise a considerable influence on the choice of 
investment location for MNEs as they account for some two-thirds of production costs 
for goods and services (Eurostat 2002:1). According to an official report by Eurostat 
(1999), the EU is not a low-labour cost area. The labour costs statistics for 1996 show 
that average hourly labour costs of EU 15 (20.2 ECU) ware higher than those in the 
USA (17.4) and in Japan (19.7). Euro-Zone costs are even higher at 21.6 ECU. In the 
most recent figures for 2000, EU average hourly labour costs were 22.19 euro. In the 
USA the average level reached 18.1 euro, and 22.0 euro in Japan in the same year 
(Eurostat, 2002).
However, hourly labour costs in the EU vary enormously across the countries. 
In 1996, there were major disparities between the levels of labour costs in the various 
member countries of the EU. In manufacturing, the average hourly labour costs varied 
from ECU 6.1 in Portugal, to ECU 26.5 in Germany. Labour costs in Belgium, 
Austria and Sweden were close to those of Germany. The EU average was ECU 20.2 
with Luxembourg and Finland closest to this average. However, labour costs in all 
cohesion countries such as Portugal (6.1 euro), Greece (9.6 euro), Spain (14.9 euro) 
and Ireland (13.8 euro) were much lower than the EU average. As table 4.1 shows, 
these enormous disparities between European countries still exist in the most recent 
figures, 1999 and 2000. In 1999, Austria, Denmark and Germany were the most 
expensive countries for hourly costs in industry, at around 27 euro. Again the lowest 
labour costs were observed in Portugal, Greece, and Spain. Similarly in 2000, average 
labour costs per hour were lowest in Portugal (8.13 euro), Greece (10.40 euro), Spain 
(14.22 euro), and Ireland (17.31 euro); and were highest in Sweden (28.56 euro).
the New Europe?: Regional Funding, Inward Investment and Prospective for the Welsh Economy”, 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 3, pp. 225-40.
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Denmark (27.10 euro) and Germany (26.34 euro). In the other six member countries, 
the hourly labour costs were close to the EU average of 22.19 euro.
Table 4.1 Hourly labour costs in industry of the EU: between 1996 and 2000
(Unit: ECU/EURO]
1996 1999 2000 Average
1996-2000
EU 15 20.2 21.5 22.70 21.4
Germany 26.5 26.8 26.54 26.6
Sweden 23.9 25.8 28.56 26.1
Belgium 25.8 26.2 N/A 26.0
Denmark 23.0 27.0 27.10 25.7
Austria 24.6 27.2 23.60 25.1
France 22.5 23.8 24.39 23.5
Netherlands 22.6 21.7 22.99 22.4
Luxembourg 19.3 22.7 24.23 22.1
UK N/A 19.3 23.85 21.6
Finland 19.7 20.8 22.13 20.8
Italy 17.2 18.8 18.99 18.3
Ireland 13.8 16.2 17.34 15.7
Spain 14.9 15.3 14.22 14.8
Greece 9.6 11.8 10.40 10.6
Portugal 6.1 7.0 8.13 7.0
Source: Eurostat (various years)
As can be seen in the above table, the average for cohesion countries between 1996 
and 2000 was 12.0 euro, just over half of the EU average (21.4 euro). And, as table
4.2 shows labour productivity of these cohesion countries is also much lower than the 
average (100) for the EU 15 (except Ireland): Spain (81), Greece (68), Portugal (58) 
and Ireland (110).
According to Eurostat (2003), average hourly labour costs are total annual labour costs divided by 
the number of hours worked during the year. Total annual labour costs are the sum of: wages & 
salaries; employers’ social contribution (i.e. voluntary social security contributions); other labour costs 
(i.e. vocational training costs). Among these factors, wages and salaries take almost 75 per cent of total 
labour costs.
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Table 4.2 Labour Productivity of the EU, 2002: EU 15 =100
Countries Average Labour Productivity
Luxembourg 127.5
Belgium 125.3
France 116.9
Netherlands 114.9
Germany 107.4
UK 86.7
Eurozone 103.4
EU 15 100
Ireland 110.1
Spain 81.8
Greece 68.1
Portugal 58.4
Cohesion states 78.3
Source: Eurostat 2003: 1
Furthermore, the average hourly labour costs for the candidate countries are much 
lower than the EU average and even lower than those of cohesion countries. In 2000, 
the average for the candidate countries was 3.47 euro, more than six times lower than 
the EU average and less than one third of the cohesion countries average. Table 4.3 
shows hourly labour costs in EU candidate countries.
Table. 4.3 Hourly labour costs in industry: The candidate countries, 2000
Countries Hourly labour cost (euro)
Cyprus 10.74
Slovenia 8.98
Poland 4.48
Czech Republic 3.90
Hungary 3.83
Slovak Republic 3.06
Estonia 3.03
Lithuania 2.71
Latvia 2.42
Romania 1.51
Bulgaria 1.35
Average (%) 3.47
Source: Eurostat (2002)
In terms of the monthly labour costs, the overall disparities are broadly same as that 
portrayed in table 4.1 and 4.3 for hourly costs. Table 4.4 presents the monthly labour
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costs per employee in 2000. The average for cohesion countries was 1,872 euro, 
around 55 per cent of the EU average (3,169 euro), and the average for the candidate 
countries, 520 euro, was 1/6 of the EU average. In that year, monthly labour costs in 
Korean industry were 1,890,000 Korean won, approximately 1,575 euro (1 euro = 
1,200 won).
Table 4.4. Comparison of monthly labour costs, 2000: MS, CS, CC, and Korea *
___________________________________________ (Unit: euro)
Countries Average monthly labour costs
Member States 3,169
Cohesion States 1,872
Candidate countries 520
Korea 1,575
Source: Eurostat 2003: 4; Korea National Statistical Office 2002 
* MS: member states, CS: cohesion states, CC: candidate countries
It can be said that average labour costs of EU member states are much higher than 
those of Korea (over two times), but the average for peripheral countries (cohesion 
and candidate countries) is close or much lower than that of Korea. So, Korean 
manufacturing investors can enjoy relatively low labour costs in these peripheral 
countries. In reality, the detailed figures in table 4.5 show that Korean consumer 
electronics chaebols in these peripheral countries have enjoyed low labour costs.
Table 4.5. Actual levels of labour costs: Four Korean companies in peripheral
countries 2001
(Unit: euro and %)
Countries Companies Hourly labour costs Monthly wages* Labour cost index 
(Head Company in 
Korea =100)
Portugal Halla industry* N/A 1,150 65
Spain Samsung electronics 9.5 1,210 72
Ireland Saehan media* 13.5 1,340 93
Hungary Samsung electronics 3.1 508 35
Source: Author’s survey and interview
Note* 1: Exact monthly labour costs of four Korean companies were not available. However, ‘Wages’ 
account for two-thirds of total (monthly) labour costs, and labour costs account for some two-thirds of 
total production costs
Note *2: Halla industry is a family company of Hyundai (one of big 4 chaebols) and Saehan media is a 
family company of Samsung
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In ail four Korean electronics companies operating in peripheral countries, the labour 
costs of local production were lower than those of companies operating in Korea. 
Notably, in the case of Halla industry in Portugal, the labour situation was as follows:
‘(With respect to the labour situation in Portugal), one of the merits of 
investment in Portugal is relatively low labour costs. Especially wages in 
this country are relatively lower than those in other European countries and 
those in Korea. In 2002, average labour costs in Portugal are less than 70 per 
cent of those in Korea. Moreover, as the Portuguese government controlled 
the increase of wages, so it has been favourable for our investment’ (Mr 
W.K. Noh (Korean Manager): December, 2001)
According to my interviews with all of the four Korean electronics investors in 
peripheral countries, their labour costs situation were generally same as those of 
Halla in Portugal. For example, in the case of Samsung Electronics in Hungary, the 
benefit of ‘low labour costs’ also played the most important role in their investment 
decision:
‘For our investment decision, low labour and production costs were the main 
benefits and most important motivations. In 2001, we paid $3.8 an hour and 
$6,100 an year for local manufacturing workers. These levels of labour costs 
are much lower than those of our head company in Korea. They paid $10.9 an 
hour and $19,100 an year for their manufacturing workers at Samsung 
Electronics in Korea (Suwon) in the same year. The average labour costs for 
Hungary is at least three times lower than the Korean average.’ (Mr J.W. Shin 
(Korean manager), January, 2002).
Let’s consider the labour costs of Korean manufacturing investors in more developed 
countries, such as the UK, Germany and France. Do they enjoy the same low- labour- 
costs benefits as Korean firms in cohesion and candidate countries? Or do they loose 
their cost competitiveness due to the high labour costs of these developed European 
countries? To answer these questions, it is worth looking at the different levels of 
labour costs 'within a single member country (notably the case of developed countries). 
In other words, in addition to national variation, the regional variation of labour costs
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is also remarkable. There are huge variations in industrial labour costs between the 
different regions as well as between the national averages. The regions with the 
highest and lowest labour costs within each single country are presented in table 4.6.
Table 4.6 Regional labour costs per hour in industry: Selected countries 2000
Country Highest Lowest
UK London (32.0) North (19.2 )
France He de France (30.8) Est (19.5)
Germany Hamburg (32.3) Thuringen(16.1)
Italy La zio (22.1) Sud(16.1)
Spain Madrid (17.0) Canarias (12.1)
Portugal Lisboa (10.5) Norte (7.1)
Source: Eurostat (2003) '‘EU labour cost in 2000’; Commission (2002) 'Main regional indicators, 
2002 ’
This regional variation is widest notably in the UK, Germany and France and 
narrowest in Greece and Portugal. The regions with the highest labour costs are 
Hamburg in Germany (32.31 euro), and He de France in France (30.84). The region 
with the lowest labour cost is Norte in Portugal (6.72 euro). In the UK, hourly labour 
costs are highest in London (32.0 euro), and lowest in North (19.2 euro). Therefore, 
even in high labour cost countries such as the UK, Germany and France, there are low 
labour costs areas within each country. As we saw in chapter 2, Korean electronics 
firms in developed member countries are concentrated in low labour costs areas. For 
example, all Korean electronics chaebols in the UK have invested in peripheral 
regions (North, Wales and Northern Ireland) which offer relatively low labour costs. 
Average labour costs of these peripheral regions are not as high as those in other UK 
regions. Table 4.7 shows labour costs in the UK peripheral regions in which Korean 
consumer electronics chaebols are currently located in detail.
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Table 4.7 Korean companies in UK peripheral regions: Hourly labour costs, and 
monthly wages 2000
Company Regions
(Objective 1&2)
Hourly labour 
costs
Monthly wages * Labour cost index 
(Head Company 
in Korea =100
Daewoo electronics Northern Ireland 11.5 1,245 128
LG electronics
(Obj.l)
North 12.1 1,305 115
Samsung electronics
(Obj.2)
North 12.0 1,315 129
LG electronics
(Obj.2)
Wales
(Obj.l)
12.2 1,390 125
Note* 1 : ‘Wages’ account for two-thirds of total (monthly) labour costs. See the note *1 of table 4.5 
Source: Author’s survey and companies in-house data
As the above table shows, average labour costs of these UK peripheral regions are 
still slightly higher than those of Korea, ranging from 115 per cent to 129 per cent of 
Korean average. However, various types of regional grants are offered to Korean 
investors and these grants played an essential role in compensating for this slight gap 
in labour costs.
4.3.2 Investment incentives
The attraction of manufacturing FDI into the EU peripheral regions is largely 
encouraged by the Commission as a mechanism for solving the regional development 
problem. Therefore, the EU has supported the assisted regions in various ways. The 
Structural and Cohesion funds support improvements in infrastructure and training to 
raise the skills of the work force, so making the areas concerned more attractive to 
foreign investors (Commission, 6* Periodic Report). Less developed regions 
(Objective 1 and 2 regions) receive support from the Structural Funds of the EU: the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the 
Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF-Guidance) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries (FIFG). The Funds' 
contributions have grown from euro 8 billion per year in 1989 to euro 32 billion per 
year in 1999. They will remain at about euro 28 billion per year from 2000 to 2006, or 
euro 195 billion over seven years (at 1999 prices).^^ The Cohesion Fund assists Spain, 
Greece, Ireland and Portugal in upgrading their transport and environmental
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional policv/intro/regions4 en.htm: the instrument of solidarity
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infrastructures. The resources of the Cohesion Fund amount to about euro 2.5 billion 
per year from 2000 to 2006, for a total of euro 18 billion (at 1999 prices). In all, 213 
billion euro will be available from 2000 to 2006 to improve the economic 
performance of the less developed regions of the EU. Objective 1 and 2 regions 
receive a majority of these funds—i.e., more than 80 per cent—as seen in Table 4.8
Table 4. 8 Structural assistance to £U  peripheral regions, 2000-2006
Structural Funds 195.0
Objective 1 135.0
Objective 2 22.0
Objective 3 24.0
Community Initiatives 10.44
Fisheries 1.11
Innovative actions 1.00
Cohesion fund 18.0 (at 1999 prices)
Source: httD://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional policv/intro/regions4 en.htm
The availability of expenditures in these regions from the EU Structural Funds attracts 
FDI inflows into the less favoured regions. In fact, various grants and subsidies are 
available to domestic as well as foreign investors wanting to set up new firms in the 
Objective 1 and 2 areas. These incentives have also been available to Korean firms, 
and these institutional packages played an essential role in the attraction of Korean 
firms into EU peripheral regions.^^ In this respect, it is important to evaluate the 
institutional packages that were offered to Korean firms.
With regard to grants for employment and training, Korean firms have been 
provided with per capita grants when they recruit and train new employees. Korean 
investors have also been provided with a significant amount of grants for land and 
buildings. In addition, some firms gained local and property tax concessions. In terms 
of the figures from the author’s survey in Table 4.9, the level of grants for investment 
in less developed countries (cohesion and candidate countries) are below or equal to 
the EU average, 20 per cent of total investment.
For more detail contents about regional incentives given to Korean investors, see: Korean Foreign 
Economic Policy Research Centre (1998) Incentive Package fo r Korean FDI : Case study o f  major 
countries, UK case. Seoul.
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Table 4.9 EU grants detail to Korean companies in cohesion and candidate countries
(Unit: euro and %)
Grants Halla industry 
(Portugal)
Samsung electro. 
(Spain)
Saehan media 
(Ireland)
Samsung electro. 
(Hungary)
Land and production 
facilities
122,600 2,388,500 N/A None
Employment and 
training
784,100 None N/A None
Tax concessions 3,403,000 None N/A Exemption of 
corporation tax 
for 10 years
No interest rate 
loans
6,927,500 1,495,900 N/A None
Grants % / 20.0 8.1 14.5 1.3
Total Investment
Source: Author’s survey (2000-2002); Companies’ in house data.
However, the level of grants available for investments in more developed countries 
went well beyond the EU average: Four plants in UK peripheral regions (Daewoo in 
Northern Ireland, Samsung in North, and two LG plants in North and Wales) were 
provided with 90 %, 25 %, 45%, and 22 % of total investment, respectively (Table 
4.10)
Table 4.10 Grants detail to Korean companies in developed member countries: 
UK case
Grants Daewoo electro. LG electronics Samsung electro. LG electronics
(Northern Ireland) (North) (North) (Wales)
Training 8,463 2,950 3,890 6,130
Land. & Facilities 17,007 3,800 8,950 27,870
Other Grants (tax 5,763 None 6,410 None
concession & low
interest rate)
Total Grants 25,470 6,750 19,250 34,000
G rants%  / 90% / 45% / 25% / 22% /
Total Investment 28,520 15,000 77,000 162,000
Total Grants £25,470k/733 £6,750k/417 £19,250k/1140 £34,000k/1980
Per employee =£34,740 =£16,180 = £16,880 = £17,170
Source: Author’s survey (2000-2002); Korean Foreign Economic Policy Research Centre (1998)
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When Deawoo invested in Northern Ireland, they were provided with an average of 
34,000 GBP in grants per employee, and an average of 16,500 GBP in grants was 
provided to the other three Korean companies in UK regions. Also, most plants in the 
other developed member countries such as France and Germany have been provided 
with grants covering more than 40 per cent of the total investment. For example, 
Samsung in Berlin was provided with 44.4 % and Daewoo in Lorraine was provided 
with 55 % grants (companies’ in house data and Korean Foreign Economic Policy 
Research Centre 1998).
To sum up, these investment grants have been ‘special benefits’ for Korean 
consumer electronics firms in the EU, especially for firms in more developed 
countries. They are the same institutional packages which Korean electronics 
chaebols were provided with by the Korean government during the 1970s and 1980s, 
in order to make domestic chaebols more competitive on the global export market. 
Various types of grants have helped Korean consumer electronics investors to reduce 
production costs in relatively high labour costs regions in the EU.
4.3.3. High Cost of Local Component Purchase?
Apart from the relatively high labour costs, there are several ‘economic 
constraints’ to Korean firms in Europe such as the high cost of component purchase 
from local companies in host regions. The supply of (electronics) components is 
strictly controlled by the EU’s local-content requirements or rules of origin. The rules 
of origin directly affect not only customers’ treatment of goods from outside the EU 
(i.e. foreign trade) but are also relevant to goods manufactured within the EU (i.e. 
FDI). In order to obtain ‘EU origin’, non-member producers must use at least 45 per 
cent EU local contents when they assemble their products through an affiliate in the 
EU (The Commission 2001, p.2)^ "^
Related to this rule of origin or local content rules, however, the EU has not stuck to a single rule of 
origin or local content rules but has rather worked case by case. More specifically, the Community is 
applying a rule of origin not of ‘last substantial process or operation’ but of ‘key manufacturing 
process’ or others depending upon the products. So, it is quite an unpredictable or inconsistent rule of 
origin or local content rules, such as the ‘case by case’ approach, and ambiguous. As Byun (1995) 
argued, the Commission needs more clear origin rules and local content regulations in connection with 
the application of other trade measures.
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I argue that most Korean electronics firms in EU host regions are extremely 
sensitive to the price of components purchase and the levels imposed by EU local 
contents regulations, because this factor is profoundly related with maintaining cost­
and price competitiveness. According to my interviews with Korean consumer 
electronics firms in the EU, all Korean electronics final assemblers faced EU local 
contents regulations ranging from 35 to 45 per cent of all components purchases. In 
spite of the high price of components, a certain amount of components must be 
bought from local companies (for example, 45 % for the case of Samsung in Spain, 
and 35 per cent for LG in the UK)
Actually, in terms of the ratio of electronic components purchased, the share of 
components purchased from host countries was relatively high. As shown in table 4. 
11, the average percentage of the purchases from host countries was 45 per cent, 
which is the same as that of purchased from the home country (44.5 per cent). As an 
extreme case, Samsung Electronics’ plant in Germany purchased 70 per cent of 
related components from the host country.
Table 4.11 The ratio of electronic component purchases hy Korean consumer 
electronics chaebols in the £U  (2000)
(Unit: %)
Companies Countries Products* From host 
EU regions
From
Korea
Other
Daewoo Elect UK VCR 35 65 0
LG Electronics. UK (North) MWO, CTV 45 40 15(China)
Samsung Elect UK CTV,MWO 35 65 0
LG Electronics UK (Wales) Computer 40 40 20(China)
Samsung Elect. Spain VCR, CTV 45 55 0
Samsung Elect. Germany CTV 70 3 27
Average (6) 45 44.5 10.5
Source: Author’s survey (2001)
Note*: MWO: Microwave oven; CTV: Colour Television; VCR: Video Cassette Recorder.
In fact, the intensification of EU local content regulations has seriously limited the 
cost competitiveness of Korean electronics firms. Korean consumer electronics firms 
have found it quite difficult to maintain cost-competitiveness in transactions with 
other European partners for components purchases. As many relevant studies have 
suggested, Korean electronics firms in industrialised economies have been able to 
retain their low manufacturing costs advantages and maintain their price
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competitiveness to some extent by importing key parts and components from home 
(Won, 1987; Shin, 1995&1998; Cherry, 2001). However, this advantage has been 
eroded by the strengthening of local content requirements for foreign production in 
industrialised countries. The high price of components in EU host regions, and EU 
local contents regulation constitutes one of the ‘locational constraints’ for Korean 
consumer electronics investors. It poses a significant threat to the price 
competitiveness of Korean consumer electronics firms (Cherry 2001:22). In this 
context, current studies argue that it is not possible for cost-saving to be the main 
motivation of investment for Korean electronics chaebols ’ investment in the EU (UN 
1996: 15; Jung, 2000: 54; Cherry, 2001; 171-72). However, I argue that their 
hypothesis needs to be tested rather than assumed correct. If the contents of the share 
of components purchase are examined in more detail, it can be said that the local 
contents rule has not actually contributed to increasing production costs for Korean 
companies in Europe.
As shown in table 4.11, around 45 per cent of electronics components are 
supplied from host country firms, but two-thirds of these transactions have been 
conducted with Korean affiliates and suppliers in the EU (Table.4.12). During my 
interviews with Korean managers from Samsung Electronics in the UK, they 
emphasized that:
 (With respect to the local contents regulations), in order to meet the EU
local content rules, at least 45 per cent of total related components must be 
provided from local firms. However, as the price of components from local 
firms is so high, we could not maintain cost-competitiveness. So the only way 
to maintain cost competitiveness and meet EU local content rules at the same 
time was to minimise the share of local purchase and to establish Korean 
affiliates or subcontractor within the EU (Mr Y. K. Lee: March, 2001)
In other words, local contents rules imposed on Korean firms in the EU played a 
crucial role in the attracting chaebols’ affiliates and Korean suppliers into the EU. 
Therefore, Korean firms could maintain cost-competitiveness due to the relatively low 
price of components from Korean suppliers within host EU regions.
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Table 4.12 Local components suppliers detail: % as supplied by Korean affiliates 
and subcontractors in the £U  (2000)
Companies
Korean affiliates Korean subcontractors (European) Local 
partners
Daewoo UK 35.5 28.5 36.0
Samsung UK 57.5 35.0 7.5
LG UK 9.0 30.0 61.0
Samsung Germany 58.7 0.0 41.3
Total 40.2 23.3 36.5
Source: Author’s survey
Korean electronics final assemblers in the EU sourced 36.5 per cent of their average 
component purchases from indigenous local firms, while the rest was supplied by 
Korean affiliates and Korean subcontractors in the EU (40.2 and 23.3 per cent, 
respectively). As a result, around 64 per cent of local components purchases are 
supplied by Korean suppliers. Therefore, I argue that the ability to source low-cost 
parts and components from home and from Korean suppliers Avithin the EU has been a 
major factor enabling Korean firms to meet (or circumvent) EU local contents rules 
and achieve cost-and price-competitiveness.
4.4 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that host regions vydthin the EU do not 
provide equal locational advantages to Korean inward investors. In fact, there are 
striking disparities in location advantages between EU peripheral and non-peripheral 
regions. In terms of production costs, although the average level of labour costs is 
higher in Western Europe than in Korea, there are low labour costs areas within the 
EU and in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, financial assistance for those low cost 
production locations from the EU has increased the attractiveness of these regions for 
efficiency seeking type FDI vvdth cost saving motivation. It can be said that these 
‘economic advantages’(e.g. low labour costs and various types of grants) have been 
main location advantages of EU peripheral regions. Therefore, one of the most 
important motivations of Korean consumer electronics companies in European 
peripheral countries has been ‘the search for lower production costs’.
According to my interviews, Korean electronics companies’ motivation invest 
in peripheral regions all fitted the same pattern. Samsung Electronics in Spain, for 
example, was motivated as follows;
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One of the incentives of investment in Spain is the relatively low labour 
costs. Labour costs in this country (especially in this region, Catalonia) are 
lower than those in Korea. Furthermore, we had various types of grants for 
investment from the Spanish local government. And we were supplied with 
relatively cheap components from our Korean affiliates within the EU. 
Therefore, the benefit of lower production costs has been one of the main 
investment motivations for us as well as other motivations such avoiding EU 
tariff barriers and import regulations. (Mr J.K Cho: October, 2001).
In this context, EU peripheral regions have satisfied the requirements of Korean 
electronics investors by offering relatively low labour costs and various investment 
subsidies, etc. This is why Korean consumer electronics investors have invested 
heavily in peripheral regions (low cost production locations) within the EU.
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion
This final chapter has two main objectives. One is to summarize briefly the 
major findings of the study as well as outlining the contributions. The other objective 
is to consider its limitation and to suggest some issues for future research.
5.1 Major findings and recapituiation of the resuits
The FDI of Korean firms in the EU has increased dramatically since the late 
1980s and early 1990s. This increase in investment activity gave rise to a debate on 
the ability of existing FDI theories to explain in full the types and motivations of 
Korean FDI in the developed economies (e.g., the EU). This research began with the 
question of why the Korean electronics firms invest in the EU. This research applied 
conventional OLI (Ownership-Location-Intemalisation) paradigm of Dunning to 
explain the motivations of Korean investment in the EU. The main questions in this 
thesis are: What are the nature of competitive Ownership (O) advantages of Korean 
firms and Location (Z) advantages of the EU? and how do both O and L advantages 
affect Korean firms’ decision to invest?
In order to analyze the above questions, this research has proposed two facts as 
the basis for analysis. First, what is unique about Korean FDI in Europe is that 
consumer electronics chaebols particularly lead the investment movement unlike the 
investment in the US and East Asian countries. Over two thirds of the total investment 
in Europe is led by consumer electronics chaebols (see Chapter 2). Therefore, in 
analyzing the competitive O advantages of Korean manufacturing firms in the EU, the 
characteristics of electronic chaebols have to be analyzed first. Second, these 
electronics chaebols are concentrating their investment on less-developed regions in 
Europe. Thus, what L advantages the Korean companies can gain from investing in 
less-developed European regions as opposed to developed European areas has to be 
analysed. Based on such an analysis framework, the paper analyzed the O advantages 
of Korean (consumer) electronics chaebols and the L advantages of less-developed 
European countries (and regions), and then analyzed how these two factors were at 
work in affecting the investment motivation of Korean companies.
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The result of analysis is inconsistent with the prediction of existing FDI theory, 
especially ‘Reverse FDI’ approach, which argues that Asian NICs firms (including 
Korean firms) in the EU do not possess the clear ownership advantages. The focus of 
this theory is simple. First, the O advantages of Korean manufacturers do not work in 
advanced countries such as the U.S. and Europe. For instance, with the technological 
gap wide, Korean companies lag behind European companies in terms of finance 
capabilities and the degree of recognition in the global market. Moreover, the high 
labour costs of Europe work to the great disadvantage of Korean companies. Second, 
investing in Southeast Asia and Latin America where Korean companies can take full 
benefits of their O advantage can be regarded as ‘normal investment’ activities. 
However, FDI in Europe where high labour costs exist and technology has advanced 
farther than Korean companies, is far-removed from helping the Korean companies 
maintain their competitive O advantages. Therefore, the investment activity in 
Europe is more for ‘learning purpose’ to adopt advanced technology or simply for 
‘avoiding trade barriers’ in a passive manner.
However, this paper raises questions about the ‘reverse investment theory’ and 
refutes the basic logic of this theory (e.g., no clear O advantages of Korean firms, 
high labour costs of the EU, and advanced technology access as the main investment 
motivation). Is it true that there is no possibility of Korean companies maintaining 
their ownership advantages (based on low production cost) when located in Europe? 
Is Europe the single place where production cost is high and technological advances 
are great? Is Europe an unattractive place for investors who pursue low production 
costs? Put it simply, this paper argues that the main motivation for Korean electronics 
firms investing in Europe comes from the pursuit of ‘cost saving’ as well as avoiding 
trade restrictions. In other words, unlike the main hypotheses of ‘reverse FDI’ 
approach, maintaining their competitive O advantages has been one of important 
incentives for Korean investors in the EU.
The following major findings of the research support the main hypotheses in 
this thesis:
1) Korean electronics chaebols have grown based on the strategy to produce 
certain limited items of products, backed up by abundant and cheap labour and the 
government support for export promotion {see chapter 3). Therefore, the basis of 
competitiveness lied in mass-producing specific consumer electronics such as 
television sets and microwaves, which do not require high technologies, while
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maintaining price competitiveness due to low production costs in home. However, 
these competitive advantages began to lose incentives after the late 1980’s as wage 
levels in Korea rose rapidly and the major export markets such as the U.S. and Europe 
increased trade barriers. As a result, for Korean electronics chaebols to maintain their 
O advantages, they began to invest in foreign markets where mainly low-cost labour 
was available. Investment in Southeast Asia and Latin America is a case in-point in a 
way to maintain low production costs. Previous researches emphasize that unlike 
investment in Southeast Asia, investing in developed areas such as Europe and the 
U.S. makes it impossible to take advantage of low production costs, which is vital to 
maintaining the competitiveness of Korean consumer electronics chaebols
2) However, it is made possible because of the Location (Z) advantages that 
under-developed European countries (regions) offer, such as relatively cheap labour 
and a significant amount of investment subsidies, which leads to low production costs. 
In other words, the 15 members of EU offer different Z advantages as investment 
hosts; different areas even within the member countries offer different Z advantages. 
Existing research is limited in recognizing this point. The previous research is based 
on a premise that all European areas offer the similar kinds of location advantages: for 
instance, high labour and production costs, advanced technology and infrastructure. 
However, as well analyzed in Chapter 4 of this thesis, in many aspects, the differences 
among countries and regions in Europe are significant. Usually, the average labour 
costs of less-developed cohesion countries such as Portugal, Greece, Ireland and 
Spain is just half the European average; and even in developed-countries such as the 
UK and Germany, there are quite a few areas within the nations where labour costs 
are much below the national average. For instance, the labour cost in North, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland is much below the national average of the UK. Korean 
companies are concentrating investment on these under-developed areas {see chapter
4).
3) Besides, EU peripheral areas are designated as the target areas for the 
regional policy of EU, with a variety of subsidies offered. As seen in Chapter 4 in 
this paper, the Korean companies investing in these areas have received a significant 
amount of diverse subsidies, greatly helping Korean firms achieve their goal of 
pursuing low production costs. Furthermore, contrary to what the existing research 
asserts, the Local contents rule set by the EU has not actually contributed to 
increasing production costs for Korean companies operating in Europe. Locating their
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subsidiaries or Korean component companies in Europe and receiving supplies at 
cheap price from them, Korean companies are complying with the Local contents rule, 
while reducing production costs in Europe.
Therefore, I believe that some ‘cost saving factors’ (such as low labour costs, various 
types of grants and ability to source low-cost components from Korean suppliers) in 
the EU have been one of major determinants for Korean firms in the EU. Low 
production cost is one of the most important location advantages that needs to be 
provided in order for Korean consumer electronics chaebols in the EU to keep their 
competitive advantages. Therefore, EU peripheral regions have satisfied the 
requirements for Korean electronics investors by offering relatively low labour cost 
and various investment subsidies, etc. This is why Korean consumer electronics 
investors have invested heavily in peripheral regions (low cost production locations) 
within the EU.
Simply, the overall benefits for Korean manufacturing firms in the EU can be 
summarised as below:
Overall benefits of FDI in the EU for Korean companies
(+) circumventing trade restrictions
(+) grants and subsidies
(+) lower labour costs than Korea
(+) low-cost sourcing from Korean suppliers
5.2 Limitation and future research
The main limit of this paper is lack of comparison regarding the investment in 
Europe as opposed to the nature of investment in the U.S. If, more comparative 
research was conducted on the characteristics of the investment activities of Korean 
companies in the U.S., which is another developed economy, the nature of investment 
by Korean firms in Europe could have been studied more in depth. Lack of 
comparison research is pointed out in detail, in the recently released article by Miotti, 
Perrin and Sachwald (2001). According to them, empirical tests on the decision of 
Korean firms to invest in the industrialised economies need to be conducted by two 
different regions (e.g., the US and the EU). With a series of comparative tests, they
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argued that Korean FDI in the US has been mainly motivated by technology sourcing 
in high tech sectors. But it is not the case for investment in Europe which is more 
concentrated in consumer electronics.^^
Also, there are some interesting topics for future research emerging from the 
current research. Notably, one of the most important topics that requires more 
attention is what impact the investment of Korean companies has on the economic 
development of EU peripheral regions. Studies conducted by the European 
Commission have found that FDI has been one of the critical factors in determining 
the success of EU regional and cohesion policy.^^ Therefore, the analysis of the costs 
and benefits of FDI have received considerable attention from both academics and 
policy-makers in the EU. However, the literature dealing with the impact of Asian 
NICs FDI in economic development of host EU regions (mostly objective 1 &2 
regions) are almost completely absent. Studies demonstrating what kind of 
performance the Asian FDI firms (notably Korean investors) display once they enter 
the host regions, or how they affect the regional development are very rare. For that 
research topic (i.e., Asian NICs FDI and EU regional development), many of the 
findings and hypotheses suggested in this thesis could be helpful. Because, the various 
effects of FDI on the host region are mainly influenced by the nature of ‘competitive 
advantages’ which investing firms and host economies possess. The effects of the FDI 
on the development of host economy are the result of the interaction between the firm 
specific O advantages of inward investors and the location specific L advantages of 
host country (Young et al, 1994; Dunning, 1998). Therefore, the main findings of this 
research - the O advantages of Korean firms and L advantages of EU peripheral 
regions- could be useful for the analysis of Korean investors’ role for the economic 
development of EU peripheral regions.
According to Miotti, Perrin and Sachiwald, motivations of Korean FDI into the EU are actually 
different from those of investment into the US. Korean FDI in the EU has not been motivated by 
technology sourcing in high tech sectors- which is the one of main motivations of Korean FDI into the 
US
Various publications of the Commission, notably ‘periodic reports’ and ‘cohesion reports’, have 
emphasized the positive contributions of FDI for reducing regional disparities. According to the ‘Sixth 
periodic report’, the economic development of a region is strongly linked to its ability to attract and 
retain highly productive activity, such as FDI. And a more recent report has emphasized that FDI 
contributes to regional development by increasing the capital stock and productive capacity (Sixth 
Periodic Report of the EU pp. 52-56,and; Preparation of the second cohesion report : 2001 pp. 17-34).
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Appendix 1 Key Informants Interviewed.
Mr H.K. Park, Senior Manager, LG electronics, Newcastle (North, England), 9* Feb. 
2001
Mr C.S. Lee, Personnel Manager, LG electronics, Newcastle (North, England), 17* 
Feb. 2001
Mr S.S. Hyun, Manager, Daewoo Electronics, Belfast (Northern Ireland), 8* March 
2001.
Mr Y.J.Cho, Managing Director, Daewoo Electronics, Belfast (Northern Ireland), 9* 
March 2001.
Mr J.H. Lee, Senior Manager, Samsung Electronics, Wynyard (North, England), 14* 
March 2001
Mr Y.K. Lee, Finance Manager, Samsung Electronics, Wynyard (North, England), 
14* March 2001
Mr K.Y. Han, Senior Manager, Samsung Electronics, Wynyard (North, England), 
21st March 2001.
Mr K.S.Kang, Senior Officer, LG Electronics, Wales, 18* July 2001.
Ms Sue Harring, Client Services Department, Wales Development Agency, Wales, 
30*, July, 2001
Mr J.K.Cho, Senior Officer, Samsung Electronics, Barcelona, Spain, 25* October 
2001
Mr A. Blasi, Vice President, Samsung Electronics, Barcelona, Spain, 26* October 
2001
Mr W.K. Noh, Finance Manager, Halla Industry, Palmela, Portugal, 7* December 
2001.
Mr S.S. KIM, Managing Director, Halla Industry, Palmela, Portugal, 8* December, 
2001.
Mr J.W. Shin, Finance Manager, Samsung Electronics, Jaszfenyszaru, Hungary, 11*, 
January, 2002.
Mr C.W. Kim, Personnel Team Leader, Samsung Electronics, Berlin (Germany), 12*, 
March 2002.
Ms S.K.Kim, Consumer Marketing Team, Samsung Electronics, Surrey (England), 
21®*, August 2003.
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Appendix 2. Korean Firms Survey Questionnaire
Research Project on The Motivation of Korean Firms Investment in 
Europe
General Information
1 .Year of Establishment
2. Address
• Europe & Korea
• Europe Headquarter
• Korea Headquarter
3. Investment and Motivation
1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Amount
4. Employment (2000)
British Korean Other Total
Managerial & Administrator
Clerical
Professional and Technical
Plant & Machine Operative
Other
5. Employment Change
1999 2000 2001 2002
Total
Plant &
Machine
Operative
6. Output (Unit)
1999 2000 2001 2002
CTVs
Monitors
MWOs
Stereos
Etc.
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IL Labour costs
Hourly Monthly Annual Average Head company 
in Korea= 100
Managerial & 
Administrator
Professional and Technical
Plant & Machine Operative
• Compared with your Korean plant, Labour costs are different? If yes, how much 
are they different?
III. Component Suppliers and Technology levels
1. Compared with your rival companies within Europe, which unique part of 
technology do you use?
2. Can you tell me about the technological levels of your companies’ products?
3. Do your suppliers have any special technology?
6. How much and what percentage of product has your company been provided with 
by suppliers?
Main
Suppliers
Location Value of Purchase % of Purchase
7. Are there any links with other EU firms in terms of technology?
8. How much is the EU local contents rule affective to your company?
IV. Incentive package and Grant
1) Which investment agency did your company contact?
2) Did your company get any grants or incentive packages from investment agencies? 
If yes, what kinds of Grants and Incentive packages were given to your company?
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Grant A G rants Grant C Grant D Other
Grant A : Factory land, Production facilities
Grant B : Employment and vocational training
Grant C : Tax concessions such as local, property and tax concessions
Grant D : Low interest rate loans
V. General motivations
1) Overall, why did your company decide to invest in the EU?
2) What are the main benefits (or disadvantages) of your company’s investment 
into the EU?
Most im portant benefits of FDI into Europe Scale
1. Easy access to technological information and technologies 5 4 3 2  1
2. Near major buyers 5 4 3 2  1
3. Abundant supply of components 5 4 3 2  1
4. Cheap raw materials 5 4 3 2  1
5. Market size and growth potential 5 4 3 2  1
6. Superiority in basic infrastructure (e.g., water, electricity, 
transportations, etc).
5 4 3 2  1
7. Stability of political and legislative/regulatory environment 5 4 3 2  1
8. Cheap labour force and cheap land cost 5 4 3 2  1
9. Host government tax incentives 5 4 3 2  1
10. Trade barriers (e.g. anti-dumping regulations, quota, etc) 5 4 3 2  1
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